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Abstract 
 This Thesis argues that violence is essential to the structures and plots of Charles 
Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities and of Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace and 
Anna Karenina, and is particularly essential to the edification, or the moral and intellectual 
improvement, of principal characters in these four novels. Additionally, this Thesis contends that 
this edification is both anticipated and reinforced by the novelists’ incorporation of counterparts 
whose demeanor and/or narrative overtly mirror that of the principal characters. 
To support this argument, I bring the theory of Thomas Carlyle into conversation with the 
novels of Dickens to illuminate Dickens’s perceptions of heroism and hero-worship, and how 
these perceptions influence the plot and characters of his novels. Specifically, I argue that 
Dickens shapes his edified characters to align with Carlyle’s delineation of sincere heroes, rejects 
Carlyle’s belief in the boundlessness and thoughtlessness of hero-worship, and engages with his 
interest in the heroic psyche to effectively underscore the moral and intellectual enlightenment of 
both Barnaby Rudge of Barnaby Rudge and Sydney Carton of A Tale of Two Cities. 
Additionally, I bring the theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau into conversation with Tolstoy 
to illustrate how the relationships between society and war and between virtue and the soldierly 
profession function within his novels. Particularly, I argue that societal forces compel Prince 
Andrey Bolkonsky and Count Pierre Bezukhov of War and Peace, as well as Alexei Vronsky of 
Anna Karenina, to become soldiers. Additionally, I contend that Tolstoy portrays the martial 
profession in a virtuous light in order to foreshadow the edification of Andrey and Pierre, who 
are morally and intellectually improved in character after entering the world of war, as well as 
the non-edification of Alexei Vronsky, who eschews the war effort in order to pursue a 
hedonistic affair with the married Anna Karenina.  
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In writing this Thesis, I seek to eviscerate commonly shared notions of violence as a 
concept that carries solely negative connotations, or as a tool injected into novels for superficial 
or simplistic reasons. In rejecting these notions, I not only substantiate the complexity of the 
function of violence in fiction, but also the life-affirming spirit of the novels that I have chosen to 
analyze. 
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Introduction 
Although Leo Tolstoy and Charles Dickens lived in different regions of the world, the 
two authors led lives that were oddly similar in a number of regards. Aside from the fact that 
both received global acclaim and fame for their novels, both men raised an inordinate number of 
children (Dickens had 10 children, Tolstoy 13) and had wildly unhappy marriages. However, 
perhaps the most striking way in which the lives of the two men paralleled one another is that 
each of them once witnessed a public execution, and was greatly traumatized by the experience. 
When abroad in Paris in 1857, Tolstoy attended the public decapitation of a French 
prisoner. The experience sickened him to his core, causing him to feel physically ill the next 
morning and keeping him awake for several nights. When noting his emotions in his personal 
journal, Tolstoy described the execution as more horrifying than the “many atrocities” he 
witnessed in war, and accordingly labeled war as a will-less display of passion and the public 
beheading as an alarmingly refined, callous homicide: 
I witnessed many atrocities in the war and in the Caucasus, but I should have been less 
sickened to see a man torn to pieces before my eyes than I was by this perfected, elegant 
machine by means of which a strong, clean, healthy man was killed in an instant. In the 
first case there is no reasoning will, but a paroxysm of human passion; in the second, 
coolness to the point of refinement, homicide-with-comfort, nothing big (Troyat 175).  
Tolstoy continued to argue that the execution demonstrated the immorality of the French national 
government, labeling human law “a farce,” and the state “a plot, designed not only to exploit but 
also to corrupt its citizens” (Troyat 175). Indeed, the event effectively turned Tolstoy against the 
entire French nation, compelling him to dismiss its citizens as having no “real value” (Troyat 
176). 
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In early 1840, Dickens also attended a public execution on a curious whim, and, like Tolstoy, 
was afterwards haunted for a protracted period of time by the “sight of helplessness and agony” 
(Kaplan 199). In his belief, similar to Tolstoy’s, that the action signified a corrupt and 
unforgiving state government, Dickens sketched out an unpublished argument in which he 
demanded the abolition of the institution of capital punishment, citing the spectacle of the death 
that he witnessed as “so loathsome, pitiful, and vile…that the law appeared to be as bad as [the 
executed], or worse” (Kaplan 200). Accordingly, in 1846, Dickens wrote widely read letters to 
the Daily News and in 1849 to the New York Times in which he advocated the abolition of public 
executions (Kaplan 200).  
Because the authors each attended the executions prior to publishing the novels examined in 
this paper, Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities and Tolstoy’s War and Peace and 
Anna Karenina, one could argue that their respective renderings of human nature in their novels 
engage with their traumatic experiences. Kaplan suggests that the event, at the very least, 
influenced the narrative of Barnaby Rudge, which features a hangman as a villainous character 
who enjoys making detailed, sociopathic soliloquies about his occupation (198). Although I 
cannot prove it, perhaps the execution Dickens witnessed shaped not only his first historical 
novel, but also his second and last; perhaps the same could be said for Tolstoy and his two 
masterpieces. Perhaps, in order to reconcile their disillusionment with government and affirm 
their faith in humanity, they connected the concept of edification – a concept which will be 
further discussed later in this Introduction – with violence and the suffering that it entails.  
In his biography Charles Dickens, E.D.H. Johnson briefly analyzes the function of suffering 
in the novels of the nineteenth century author, arguing that suffering is experienced by 
“characters who are both defenseless and blameless, and whose plight, therefore, elicits a 
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primarily emotional response” (36). In this quotation, Johnson suggests that Dickens prefers to 
inflict suffering upon particularly innocent, pitiable characters in an effort to more effectively 
elicit the sympathy of the reader. The mentally handicapped Barnaby Rudge, the eponymous 
protagonist of one of Dickens’s earliest novels, surely is a character “both defenseless and 
blameless,” and thus whose suffering in the novel is highly pitied by any reader with a beating 
heart. Yet, Sydney Carton, one of the principal characters of A Tale of Two Cities, a novel 
Dickens wrote roughly 18 years after Barnaby Rudge, does not espouse either defenselessness or 
blamelessness. In fact, his suffering in the novel is entirely self-inflicted; he mourns the futility 
of a life that he has consciously chosen to lead, and chooses to physically suffer – sacrificing his 
life at the guillotine in place of another. 
 Indeed, not all of Dickens’s suffering characters are immaculate in their vulnerability. 
Perhaps more significant is not the relative innocence of the Dickensian figures who suffer, but 
how their suffering influences and even transforms them. As Johnson argues, evil is a force that 
“always darkens the world of Dickens’ fiction,” yet, the novelist himself, particularly at the 
beginning of his career as a writer, was more concerned with the effects rather than the roots of 
this “evil” (36). In this regard, Dickens was like Tolstoy, who was in turn powerfully influenced 
by the writings of Dickens, at a young age denoting David Copperfield as a literary discovery of 
“immense influence” on him (Troyat 57-58). One could thus reasonably argue that Dickens 
played a part in stimulating Tolstoy’s interest in the understanding of human suffering, and his 
decision to explore its depths in his two most famous (and longest) works, War and Peace and 
Anna Karenina. Like Dickens, the manner in which Tolstoy causes his characters to suffer in 
these novels illustrates his curiosity in the effects (rather than the causes) of suffering – 
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particularly in its power to irreparably transform the characters who most profoundly experience 
it. 
 In incorporating violence, and thus suffering, into their novels, Tolstoy and Dickens were 
to some extent engaging with the conventions of European romanticism, which encouraged 
literary narratives that moved “[f]rom desire to death via passion” or, as Swiss cultural historian  
Denis de Rougemont argued, via “suffering” (243): 
[P]assion means suffering. Therefore inasmuch as our notion of love enfolds our notion 
of woman, it is linked with a theory of the fruitfulness of suffering which encourages or 
obscurely justifies in the recesses of the Western mind a liking for war. (de Rougemont 
243) 
For de Rougemont, Western writers often symbolically identified war with romance because the 
former functioned as an appealing way to heighten the suffering of their characters; similarly, 
they employed language reminiscent of war in contexts of romance to emphasize or dramatize 
such suffering. Indeed, de Rougemont perceived a “peculiar [connection] between a certain view 
of woman and the European conception of war,” and argued that this connection “has had 
profound consequences for morality, education, and politics” (243).  
Although all of the characters examined in this Thesis are subject to extreme conditions 
of violence, not all characters go to war, and not all of these characters suffer in such a way that 
can be traced back to or linked with their romantic love for a woman. Yet, scenes featuring two 
of the five analyzed characters, Alexei Vronsky of Anna Karenina and Sydney Carton of A Tale 
of Two Cities, powerfully exemplify de Rougemont’s conception of suffering as a form of 
passion and – more generally – his perception of Western writers’ attunement to ideals of 
European romanticism, and their tendency to reach backwards to medieval traditions of courtly 
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love. Moreover, these characters illustrate his analysis of passion as a force which achieves “its 
apotheosis” in death, de Rougemont classifying death as “indeed the end of all things” (de 
Rougemont 260). 
While not all characters’ suffering is intertwined with romantic love, in the four novels 
examined in this paper, all of the characters mentally and physically suffer in an ethos of both 
organized and unorganized violence, and are morally and intellectually altered by their 
experiences. The novel containing the most violence is War and Peace; there are 587,287 words 
in the English translation by Constance Garnet, and one-third of them deal with war (Briggs 46). 
War and Peace is the longest novel examined in this paper, teeming with more plots and 
characters than Charles Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities or Anna Karenina. 
While each of these novels contain a number of scenes pertinent to this paper, War and Peace 
alone contains a scene that illustrates the paradoxical relationship between combative 
atmospheres and what I will call edification, an experience and trope wherein violence is a 
salient element in the transformation of fictional characters.  
Two fictional characters who experience this transformation are Prince Andrey 
Bolkonsky and Count Pierre Bezukhov, who both enlist to defend Russia in the Napoleonic Wars 
of 1803-1815. A crucial scene in the novel features a segment of dialogue between the two 
soldiers and close friends that takes place in the village of Knyazkovo, where the regiment of 
Andrey is camped out in preparation for a battle:   
‘There’s one thing I would do, if I were in power,’ he began again. ‘I wouldn’t take 
prisoners. What sense is there in taking prisoners? That’s chivalry. The French have 
destroyed my home and are coming to destroy Moscow; they have outraged and are 
outraging me at every second. They are my enemies, they are all criminals to my way of 
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thinking. And so thinks Timohin, and all the army with him. They must be put to death. 
Since they are my enemies, they can’t be my friends, whatever they may have said at 
Tilsit.’ 
‘Yes, yes,’ said Pierre, looking with shining eyes at Prince Andrey. ‘I entirely agree with 
you!’  
The question that had been disturbing Pierre all that day, since the Moshaisk hill, now 
struck him as perfectly clear and fully solved. (Tolstoy 710) 
Andrey and Pierre are well known for engaging in dialectical conversations in which neither of 
them can manage to agree on a single position. Yet, in the one moment in the novel in which the 
two friends unite before a battle in a war that will change them forever, they concur on a rather 
arbitrary subject: the inadvisability of taking prisoners of war.  
Significantly, their shared view of taking prisoners is both ironic and anticipatory: Pierre 
himself is taken by the French as a prisoner of war, and not only survives the experience, but 
ascends from it a better man. Had Pierre and Andrey’s mutual condoning of the execution of all 
prisoners been actualized by the French, not only would they have been in violation of European 
law and codes of civilized behavior, but Andrey would have lost a friend, and Pierre would never 
have lead a life of meaning and happiness, one shaped by his moral and intellectual 
improvement.  
 The perspectives of Andrey and Pierre mirror that of any reader beginning a novel that 
they know to contain scenes of organized or unorganized violence, i.e. scenes of war, riots, 
executions, and duels. Readers often feel compelled to dismiss these paradigms of violence as 
inevitably harmful and ruinous to individuals and/or society; they cannot perceive another 
function for violence other than to wreak havoc and destruction in the lives of the novel’s 
12 
characters. In this regard, they mimic the morbidity of Andrey and Pierre, who view the sole end 
of war as the elimination of the enemies of Russia. As made apparent in the above dialogue, the 
characters do not see the point of not keeping this violence consistent in all areas of war, and 
thereby do not see the point of capturing and not killing soldiers. Andrey and Pierre seem to 
agree that the conventions by which prisoners are well treated is merely a chivalrous convention, 
conveniently forgetting the traditional, formal, and conventional nature of the whole institution 
of war in the eighteenth century. 
 Perhaps Tolstoy concurred with Andrey and Pierre, and thus believed that the French and 
the Russians should certainly not act as if they are anything more than enemies in the context of 
organized combat. But Tolstoy understood the legalities of war, and in his treatment of Pierre he 
challenges their views about prisoners on experiential grounds, because in Pierre’s captivity – an 
experience laden with both physical and mental suffering – he undergoes a complete moral and 
intellectual transformation.  
This is not to say that Tolstoy advocates violence as an essential path to moral or 
intellectual advancement, and I am not arguing that violent circumstances are fundamental in 
producing a radical change in human nature. Rather, I am arguing that Dickens’s two historical 
novels and Tolstoy’s two most celebrated novels incorporate violent circumstances as an element 
of the edification of one or more of their principal characters. 
 
What is Edification? 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “edification” as: 1. A building up in faith 
and holiness of life (Cf. I. Cor. 14) (ME); 2. mental or moral improvement; instruction (1660). I 
expand upon this definition of ‘edification’ to distinguish (1) one’s moral improvement as a 
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transformation in which the character reaches a higher level of self-fulfillment and/or self-
actualization than previously known to them and (2) one’s intellectual improvement as a 
transformation in which the character achieves a holistic comprehension of their own purpose 
and/or the purpose of humankind. 
In Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (1755) — on which the OED is 
based — the definition of “edification” is illustrated by a quotation from Jeremy Taylor, the 
seventeenth century Anglican clergyman: “[o]ur blessed Saviour told us, that we must account 
for every idle word, not meaning that every word not designed for edification, or less prudent, 
shall be reckoned for a sin” (333). Taylor’s focus on the function of language (“idle word”) in 
edification is echoed by the OED that cites I Corinthians, chapter 14 as illustrating the meaning 
of “edification”:   
Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may prophesy. For he 
that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man 
understandeth him; howbeit in the spirit he speaketh mysteries. But he that prophesieth 
speaketh unto men to edification, and exhortation, and comfort. He that speaketh in an 
unknown tongue edifieth himself; but he that prophesieth edifieth the church. 
Both Taylor and the Corinthians draw attention to the relationship of edification to speech and to 
a particular use of language as a mode of action and self-revelation. Their conviction is that 
humans evolve both morally and intellectually through movement and speech, through action 
and interaction. My discussion takes this nexus of ideas and values as a critical touchstone, and I 
seek to demonstrate how, in crafting characters who become morally and intellectually 
enlightened, Dickens and Tolstoy highlight both action and speech to elucidate and to reify the 
edification of their characters.  
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Dickens, Tolstoy, and Edification 
Although I am principally concerned with the edification of fictional characters, it is equally 
notable that Tolstoy and Dickens believed in the human pursuit of moral and intellectual 
improvement in the reality existing outside of the pages of their novels. For example, at a young 
age Tolstoy fashioned a list of the ‘Rules of Life,’ or “recipes for virtue” that must be emulated 
in order to lead a perfect life: 
Every minute he stole from the [Law] Department was spent in reading an exalting discourse: 
‘Gogol, Rousseau, Pushkin, Goethe’s Faust, Hegel…’ Since January 1847 he had been 
keeping a diary of his thoughts and actions, and especially of his resolutions. His idée fixe 
was to perfect his famous ‘Rules of Life.’ It seemed to him that the more clearly he defined 
perfection, the more chance he had of attaining it. His recipes for virtue covered whole pages. 
(Troyat 52-53) 
Indeed, in his early years Leo Tolstoy aspired to reach the apotheosis of human perfection, 
otherwise known to him as a state of unquestionable goodness; as he established in the journals 
he kept: “The goal of my life, it is plain, is the good” (Troyat 103). He carefully considered the 
various paths he could take to attain this goodness, and chose one characterized by the great 
works of Western literature and philosophy. In fact, two of Tolstoy’s greatest inspirations were 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau – whose influence in Tolstoy’s life will be discussed in this paper – and 
Charles Dickens (Troyat 57-58).  
Still, the transformative impact of Tolstoy’s application to works of the Western canon falls 
in comparison to that of his experiences in war. Even while devouring great works of literature, 
Tolstoy found himself succumbing to the temptations of Russian society, gambling and drinking 
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freely and frequently. Though he was intrigued by the prospect of going to war, he didn’t 
initially believe in the Caucasian War – though he concurrently admitted to the lack of 
earnestness in himself, labeling himself “a good-for-nothing wretch” (Troyat 62). Yet, eager to 
“triumph over his bad habits,” Tolstoy enlisted in a regiment in the Caucasus, where he 
continued to try to improve himself, attempting to resist the urge to gamble and keeping a diary 
in which he numbered the personal flaws that he sought to correct (Troyat 80, 83). Tolstoy was 
aware of his many shortcomings, and noted in his diary his unwavering intent to stop traveling 
astray from the “path of virtue”: 
I am excessive, vacillating, unstable, stupidly vain and aggressive, like all weaklings. I am 
not courageous. I am so lazy that idleness has become an ineradicable habit with me…I am 
honorable, that is, I love the path of virtue…and when I depart from it I am unhappy and am 
glad to return to it. (Troyat 116) 
Desiring to make himself useful in some way, and still determined to demonstrate his 
commitment to goodness, Tolstoy crafted a Plan for the Reform of the Army, in which he 
criticized the current conditions of the Russian army without proposing any remedies (Troyat 
123). It wasn’t long before he abandoned the treatise and turned his attention to founding a new 
religion, jotting down in his diary the fundamental principles that would constitute his future 
doctrine and shape his future writings. Two of these principles were the “search for physical 
well-being” and for “moral perfection” (Troyat 124). Indeed, this idea of “moral perfection” is 
one that remained with Tolstoy throughout his life, permeating his own manner of living as well 
as his novels. 
 Tolstoy did not alone in embracing the concept of human improvement; his belief in the 
capability of humans to augment their own goodness and thus their overall character was a 
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concept that dually captivated Dickens. Yet, unlike Tolstoy, Dickens was not as invested in 
perfecting himself as he was in ameliorating the lowly circumstances of others so they could lead 
better, morally improved lives. Indeed, in the early stages of his career, Dickens was driven by 
an insatiable urge to create “a powerful social statement, ‘a Sledge hammer’ that would respond 
to the abysmal treatment of the poor” (Kaplan 175) as well as to “the care for the mentally and 
physically ill” (Kaplan 211). Yet, rather than taking to the streets or publishing a politicized call 
to action, Dickens expressed his concern for the social conditions of the poor by creating 
fictional characters, through which he was able to critique society. As Johnson argues, Dickens 
was not “a practical reformer,” but “a moralist” who tackled contemporary problems by 
addressing them in his novels: 
As a novelist, Dickens’ concern was with characters, not principles. This is simply to say 
that he did not think of himself as a practical reformer, responsible for advocating 
specific measures to eliminate the evils he deplored, but rather as a moralist whose 
mission was to lay bare the origins of those evils in prevalent attitudes of heart and mind. 
(Johnson 45) 
Still, Dickens’s keen awareness of these “evils in prevalent attitudes of heart and mind” 
does not signify his pessimistic view of humanity. On the contrary, Dickens’s commitment to 
social reform reflected his belief in human goodness; like Tolstoy, he strongly believed in the 
improvement of humankind. This belief is exemplified by the novelist’s ten-year commitment to 
rehabilitate former prostitutes, working tirelessly “as if the redemption of a small number of 
fallen women symbolized the potential for wider salvation” (Kaplan 228). Dickens instituted a 
marks system, or “a form of reward and punishment as inducement to improved behavior” for 
these women to follow, and circulated an Appeal to Fallen Women, in which he expressed his 
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compassion for them as well as, admittedly, his acceptance of “deeply believed stereotypes, and 
some minor priggishness” (Kaplan 229). Despite the chauvinism entwined in his interest in 
helping prostitutes, Dickens genuinely believed that his efforts could produce moral 
improvement: his primary objective was to have these women “be tempted to virtue” (Kaplan 
229). His confidence in their ability to change for the better partially demonstrates his belief and 
interest in the concept of edification, which is illuminated in the novels examined in this Thesis 
(Kaplan 229).   
 Dickens’s novels and progressive efforts often concentrated on social rather than 
individual change. However, this is not to say that Dickens didn’t also believe that humans could 
change even if society didn’t. Indeed, when writing his annual short Christmas novels, Dickens 
changed their theme after 1844; partly influenced by the philosophy and social criticism of 
Thomas Carlyle, Dickens’s later novels emphasized “the reformation of the individual heart” 
rather “than of the social system” (Kaplan 180). Though Carlyle’s influence on Dickens will be 
further analyzed in this paper, it is worth noting now that he played a role in shaping the 
perspective Dickens would take when illustrating his characters’ transformations, particularly 
their edification in his novels.  
The novels of Dickens and Tolstoy starkly diverge in style and purpose; while Dickens 
crafted his works with the intention of stimulating social change, Tolstoy was opposed to matters 
of legislation and sociology invading “the rightful territory of Art” (Troyat 190) Yet, both writers 
were captivated by the possibility of human improvement, which exercised a shaping influence 
on their novels, in all four of which violence functions as a significant component of the 
principal male characters’ edification.  
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Summary of Argument 
The main purpose of this Thesis is to demonstrate that violence is a central element in the 
structure of Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities and in Tolstoy’s War and Peace 
and Anna Karenina, and in the edification of certain central characters in these novels. At crucial 
points, I argue that Carlyle and Rousseau become instrumental in the vision articulated by 
Dickens and Tolstoy. Moreover, I conclude each chapter with a section in which I examine the 
counterparts of each of the analyzed characters and illustrate how they function to anticipate and 
reinforce the principal characters’ edification – or, in terms of Alexei Vronsky, his non-
edification. 
Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship and The Heroic in History and Rousseau’s On the 
Social Contract and essay, “The State of War,” exercise significant influence on Dickens and 
Tolstoy’s narratives. Particularly, I explore the role that Carlyle and Rousseau’s theories play in 
influencing the plot trajectory that culminates in the edification of Dickens and Tolstoy’s 
characters. Specifically, Carlyle’s notions of heroism and hero-worship function as a backdrop in 
both Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities, and Tolstoy engages with Rousseau’s notions of 
violence, particularly his notions of war. 
In Barnaby Rudge, the process of edification is played out through its eponymous, slow-
minded protagonist, Barnaby Rudge, who becomes an unwitting rioter in the Gordon Riots of 
1780. In A Tale of Two Cities, edification transforms the benevolent but defeatist Sydney Carton, 
who sacrifices himself to the guillotine in the French Revolution, which took place in the late 
1700s.  
I argue that Dickens’s novels engage with three components of Carlyle’s text. Dickens is 
interested in testing Carlyle’s emphasis of sincerity as the predominant feature of heroism, and 
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he achieves this by injecting sincerity into the principal characters of his novels. Secondly, I 
illustrate how Dickens brings into conversation Carlyle’s advocacy of the boundless adulation of 
heroes by illuminating the moral and political dangers of hero-worship. Furthermore, I maintain 
that Dickens responds to Carlyle’s privileging heroic intellect over ordinary human action by 
enabling the edification of his heroes and by rejecting Carlyle’s concept of hero-worship. 
In War and Peace, two principal characters experience edification following their 
participation in the Napoleonic Wars. The weary and war-hungry Andrey Bolkonsky fights in the 
wars twice and is eventually fatally wounded. The impulsive Count Pierre Bezukhov also 
voluntarily fights in the Napoleonic Wars, but unlike Andrey is captured by the French and 
ultimately survives. Finally, in Anna Karenina, I examine the hedonistic soldier Alexei Vronsky, 
who loses his interest in and then deserts the war effort to pursue an illicit affair with the married 
female protagonist of the novel, the title of which bears her name. Here, in contrast to the other 
three novels, I grapple with Alexei Vronsky’s failure to become edified, rather than with his 
edification. Vronsky is important in my overall argument because his career as a soldier, and 
thus his career in war, is presented as a virtue. Thus, when Vronsky loses interest in the war 
effort and effectively leaves the army because of his love affair with Anna Karenina, the 
narrative moralizes his situation, suggesting that the love affair is an immorality from which the 
military could have saved Vronsky. 
A question that governs my discussion of Tolstoy is: how does violence function in his 
novels? In Tolstoy’s novels the violence of war is presented as an inevitable product of fate, and 
as an event wherein men cannot exercise their own will. This perspective mirrors Walter 
Benjamin’s own view of violence, as Benjamin argues in his “Critique of Violence” that 
violence alone “can guarantee law,” and that this form of legal violence is fundamentally similar 
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to “the mythical manifestation of immediate violence,” or the manifestation of the wills of the 
gods, not the wills of men (296). For Benjamin, legal violence is fated and forms the foundation 
of the working political structure.  
At the same time, I argue, Tolstoy is open to the influence of Rousseau. Three aspects of 
his political theory influence Tolstoy’s treatment of war and his characterization in ways that 
prompt him to orient his central characters in relation to war and service. Tolstoy toys with 
Rousseau’s idea that men only become violent after entering society and become corrupted by 
social values and niceties. In Tolstoy’s novels, society drives certain characters to become 
soldiers and go to war. Additionally, Tolstoy is intrigued by Rousseau’s faith in the non-
combative spirit of humankind, and his idea that ideal virtue can be cultivated in an environment 
similar to that of a regiment of soldiers. These ideas of Rousseau lie behind Tolstoy’s association 
of war, violence, society, the military, and edification in the lives of a number of principal 
characters. 
By virtue, Rousseau means “old-fashioned pagan virtues,” like courage and frugality, 
rather than “fashionable” virtues such as politeness, sociability, or the Christian virtues of piety 
and chastity (Wootton xii). Alasdair MacIntyre explicates these “old-fashioned pagan virtues” by 
identifying them as Jacobin:  
Liberty, fraternity and equality were not the only Jacobin virtues. Patriotism and love of 
family were both important: the persistent bachelor was regarded as an enemy of virtue. 
So was the man who failed to do useful productive work or who failed to do good work. 
It was regarded as a virtue to dress simply, to live in a modest dwelling, to be – of course 
– regular in attending one’s club and performing other civic duties, to be courageous and 
assiduous in the work given one to do by the revolution.” (MacIntyre 238) 
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Indeed, Rousseau’s concept of virtue included patriotism, a man’s devotion to his family, his 
productivity, and especially his courage. All of the hybrid associations of Rousseau’s concept of 
virtue inspire Tolstoy’s view of the military as a virtuous organization and soldiering as a 
virtuous profession, and these ideas all come under scrutiny in Tolstoy’s novels.  
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Section I: Carlyle & Dickens 
 
In May 1840, Thomas Carlyle delivered a series of six lectures collectively entitled On 
Heroes, Hero-Worship and The Heroic in History. These lectures analyzed famous historical 
male figures that Carlyle defends as heroic and deserving of limitless and fervent worship. The 
lectures were published in 1841, and are notable for a number of contentious positions, including 
Carlyle’s defense of violence as a means of accumulating greatness and thus establishing 
heroism. The ‘hero’ who Carlyle uses as a paradigm to endorse violence as a potential gateway 
to heroism is Muhammad, the father of the religion of Islam.  
In order to spread Islam to other nations, Muhammad engaged in wide-ranging combat 
with peoples across the world, committing millions of casualties and indoctrinating the survivors 
in the nascent religion. Carlyle recognizes these hideous actions, as well as Muhammad’s 
common reputation as “a scheming Impostor, a Falsehood incarnate” who believed in a religion 
that equated to “a mere mass of quackery and fatuity” (53). Nevertheless, Carlyle casts 
Muhammad as a hero and vehemently defends him for turning to warfare as a measure of 
propagating his religion: 
I care little about the sword: I will allow a thing to struggle for itself in this world, with 
any sword or tongue or implement it has, or can lay hold of. We will let it preach, and 
pamphleteer, and fight, and to the uttermost bestir itself and do, beak and claws, 
whatsoever is in it; very sure that it will, in the long-run, conquer nothing which does not 
deserve to be conquered. (Carlyle 73) 
Indeed, Carlyle cares “little about the sword,” largely because he believed that those who are 
defeated by it are unimpressive, vulnerable individuals and therefore “deserve to be conquered.” 
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Furthermore, Carlyle expresses his support for Muhammad, and thus his support for the hero’s 
use of violence, because he does not see humans as directly liable or accountable for the 
outcomes – however horrifying they may be – of their actions. According to Carlyle, the human 
will operates according to its own impersonal rules; as he asserts, “Nature herself is umpire” of 
war, and Nature “can do no wrong” (Carlyle 73).  
Charles Dickens, close friend to and avid reader of Thomas Carlyle, was dramatically 
influenced by Carlyle’s writings throughout his life – particularly those which dealt with issues 
relating to poverty and social justice, as evidenced by Dickens’s choice to dedicate his political 
novel Hard Times to the writer. Still, while Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic 
in History “shifted the locus of authority from the realm of literature to the realm of politics,” it 
is not particularly concerned with social issues (Vanden Bossche).  
Nonetheless, this Thesis argues that Carlyle influences Dickens’s notions of both heroism 
and hero-worship, which offers an explanation as to why he edifies two of his literary characters. 
Indeed, Barnaby Rudge aids in toppling London as a protester in the Gordon Riots of 1780, but 
survives the length of the novel and emerges from it morally and intellectually improved in 
character. Sydney Carton, the leading character of A Tale of Two Cities, is similarly transformed 
after he sacrifices himself to the guillotine of the French revolutionaries to substantiate his 
passionate love for Lucie Manette. The French Revolution serves as the ideal backdrop for 
Carton to meet these ends, as de Rougemont declares it to have been an event in which 
“collective instincts and catastrophic passions were being let loose” (256). 
So, how exactly does Dickens engage with Carlyle’s texts? For one, both Barnaby Rudge 
and Sydney Carton meet Carlyle’s definition of heroism, which delineates the feature of sincerity 
as the most vital characteristic of heroic characters. Second, Dickens’s novels implicitly criticize 
24 
the concept of hero-worship, and therefore in part challenge Carlyle’s adamant support of the 
devoted adulation of heroic figures. Moreover, in not only forming these viewpoints, but also in 
structuring his characters so that they partake in the experience of edification, Dickens engages 
with Carlyle’s emphasis of the mental dexterity of heroes. 
Was Dickens influenced by Carlyle’s views of violence, particularly his justification of 
violence as a tool to promulgate and establish heroism? Once, in the wake of a global incident, 
Carlyle and Dickens did evidently see eye to eye on the question of the legitimacy of a leader’s 
use of violence to maintain his power. In the mid-1800s, the writers joined a committee of 
defense that supported the actions of Jamaican governor Edward Eyre, who had been charged 
with using excessive violence to suppress an 1865 civil rebellion (Kaplan 481). Still, their mutual 
participation in this committee does not shine much light on whether Dickens agreed with or 
opposed Carlyle’s defense of violence as a potential means of establishing one’s heroism, 
particularly because Dickens analyzes the violence in his novels – which imitate and dramatize 
the violent nature of true historical events – through a highly critical lens.  
Violence is a significant component of the plot trajectories of the edified characters in 
both Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities. For Barnaby Rudge, violence is a formidable 
element in a journey that ends with his moral and intellectual improvement; for Sydney Carton, 
violence is an element that is not just formidable but also essential to reaching those same ends. 
Thus, although it cannot be definitively stated that Dickens supported a hero’s use of violence to, 
like Muhammad, extend or reinforce their convictions or ideologies, his novels suggest that he 
believed that violence could be a significant element of the moral and intellectual improvement 
of heroic figures. 
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Argument 1: Sincerity as Heroic 
The Great Man's sincerity is of the kind he cannot speak of, is not conscious of: nay, I 
suppose, he is conscious rather of insincerity; for what man can walk accurately by the 
law of truth for one day? No, the Great Man does not boast himself sincere, far from that; 
perhaps does not ask himself if he is so: I would say rather, his sincerity does not depend 
on himself; he cannot help being sincere! (Carlyle 54) 
On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History promotes the worship of a number of 
renowned and controversial male figures, two of whom are eighteenth century men who are 
pertinent to my argument: Napoleon Bonaparte and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
Napoleon Bonaparte is a notorious French conqueror and political leader who appears in 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace in a fictionalized and highly satirized form, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
is a French writer and philosopher who heavily influenced the life and novels of Tolstoy. Carlyle 
chooses not to discuss either figure extensively; in fact, he freely belittles both men, arguing that 
the actions of Bonaparte in particular largely amounted to “smoke and waste” and that the figure 
himself was indeed not as great as other heroic figures in his book, like Oliver Cromwell (285). 
Regarding Rousseau, Carlyle flatly declares that he “cannot say so much” and, among other 
things, castigates his egoism, excitability, and morbidity (217). Yet, Carlyle nonetheless claims 
that Bonaparte and Rousseau are paradigms of heroism because they retain a quality that he 
classifies as the “the first characteristic of all men in any heroic”: “a deep, great, genuine 
sincerity” (54).  
 Carlyle identifies sincerity as the foremost virtue of all heroes, and reinforces the 
significance of the quality frequently throughout the text. Indeed, Carlyle’s heroes are men who 
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imagine and retain ideas that they “believed [in] and laid to heart” with “a wild rapt earnestness,” 
or an ardent, unforced level of sincerity (74).  
Still, Carlyle is not arguing that all individuals who are sincere are necessarily heroes. 
Carlyle’s sincerity is the product of the way in which he writes; he highlights sincerity in order to 
illustrate the wide array of truths and values that he believes should be universally admired. In 
asserting that sincerity is an essential quality of heroism, Carlyle is demonstrating that heroes are 
composed of a number of fundamentally good qualities, and hence is legitimizing their right to 
be worshipped. Indeed, in further detailing his understanding of heroism, Carlyle reveals that 
heroes are instilled with noble qualities that extend beyond that of sincerity: 
[A]ll sorts of Heroes are intrinsically of the same material; that given a great soul, open to 
the Divine Significance of Life, then there is given a man fit to speak of this, to sing of 
this, to fight and work for this, in a great, victorious, enduring manner; there is given a 
Hero, — the outward shape of whom will depend on the time and the environment he 
finds himself in. (Carlyle 137) 
Carlyle’s heroes are men who are universally endowed with “a great soul,” and thus are equipped 
to communicate their knowledge of “the Divine Significance of Life” in a manner that is “great, 
victorious, [and] enduring.” Still, while Carlyle’s heroic figures share these meritorious qualities, 
the type of hero they become differs dependent upon the time and circumstances into which they 
are born. Had Bonaparte and Rousseau been born in different environments or conditions, 
Carlyle argues that the manner in which their intrinsic “material” manifests itself, or the methods 
they would have taken to demonstrate their heroism, might have differed. Nonetheless, they 
would have retained innately heroic qualities, like that of sincerity. 
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Although Carlyle was not particularly enthralled with either Bonaparte or Rousseau as 
human beings, he could not deny their sincerity, and thus could not deny their heroism. In asking 
his readers to “discern withal that [Napoleon] had a certain instinctive ineradicable feeling for 
reality; and did base himself upon fact, so long as he had any basis,” Carlyle acknowledges that 
Bonaparte’s actions were sincere because he executed them in his genuine belief that he would 
persevere (281). Similarly, in typifying Rousseau as a hero, Carlyle emphasizes the “spark of 
real heavenly fire” in his heart, and – mirroring his description of Bonaparte – acknowledges 
“the ineradicable feeling and knowledge that this Life of ours is true” (219). In employing 
language like ‘real’ and ‘true,’ Carlyle is deliberately stressing the sincerity of Rousseau, and 
thus offering an explanation for why he cannot eschew typifying him as a hero. 
As established, not only Carlyle’s works but Carlyle himself influenced Dickens in 
substantial ways, as Dickens was both a reader of and a personal friend to him. While it is 
impossible for scholars to be wholly certain of the extent of Carlyle’s influence in Dickens’s 
multitude of novels, one formidable theme apparent in both Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two 
Cities appears to be the product of Carlyle’s influence: sincerity, specifically its cultivation in 
heroic figures. The former novel, which Dickens began work on only months after Carlyle 
delivered the lectures that became On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History, is 
especially concerned with the notion of sincerity as an essential heroic feature; the latter novel, 
published nearly 20 years later, is less explicit in its interest in sincerity, yet its presence in the 
hero remains clear. 
Unlike Carlyle, in these two novels Dickens does not use sincerity to corroborate one’s 
heroism. Because Carlyle has already substantiated that sincerity is a prominent feature of 
heroism, Dickens instills the quality in his principal male characters to merely illustrate rather 
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than verify their heroism. He molds these characters in such a way that, as Covert phrases it, 
each of them “is sincere in what he thinks, what he says, and what he does” and thus is made 
“great.”  
  In short, Dickens utilizes the trait of sincerity as a form of distinction; his heroes are shaped 
by a clear and inarguable sense of sincerity, and his non-heroes are not. 
 
Barnaby Rudge 
 Roughly midway into Barnaby Rudge, a villainous character, Simon Tappertit, declares 
that “if we are not sincere, we are nothing. Nothing upon this earth” (Dickens 216). In the 
context of the story, this statement is steeped in irony and Dickens’s signature sardonic wit: 
Simon Tappertit is a target of mockery throughout the text, a boastful and arrogant young man 
who leads a group of scoundrels that help to wreak unmitigated havoc and destruction on 
London as members of the ‘No Popery’ movement, which is led by and involves insincere 
characters with insincere motives. For him to utter an assertion which carries such overarching 
meaning is as peculiar as it is comical. Yet, the statement nonetheless establishes Dickens’s 
ardent interest in sincerity, which is a formidable quality of the novel’s protagonist and hero, 
Barnaby Rudge. 
 Barnaby Rudge is arguably one of the most atypical heroes to appear in a Dickens novel 
– or any novel, for that matter. Though he is a quite strong and driven grown man, the tasks that 
he can accomplish are limited because he is mentally disabled. To state it most simply, Barnaby 
has the build and suppleness of a well-trained athlete, but the irascible spirit and stunted intellect 
of a child. Indeed, Gabriel Varden, a good-hearted blacksmith and one of the novel’s more 
virtuous characters, labels Barnaby “a jewel” in admiring how his agility, coupled with his 
29 
simplistic view of the world, allows him to come and go “with ease where we think ourselves 
much wiser would make a poor hand of it” (Dickens 51). Additionally, the savage and immoral 
Hugh, though diverging from Varden in character and in principle, shares with him a genuine 
appreciation of Barnaby, stating that there isn’t “a better, nor a nimbler, nor a more active man, 
than Barnaby Rudge” (Dickens 381). In fact, this facet of Barnaby’s character is exactly what 
compels Hugh to take advantage of his dim-wittedness, manipulating him into participating in 
the Gordon Riots, which were Anti-Catholic protests that actually took place in London in 1780 
and drive the action of Dickens’s novel.  
 Indeed, Hugh enlists Barnaby for the egregious movement, fully aware that he lacks the 
mental capacity to comprehend the licentiousness of his actions, or the ignobility of the cause for 
which he is fighting. Yet Dickens deliberately implicates the goodly Barnaby with these deceitful 
men for reasons beyond his desire to increase the reader’s sympathy for the character. I believe 
that the author was aware that placing Barnaby in this context would plainly highlight his 
sincerity, and reify the significance of sincerity in the novel as a whole. For not only does 
Barnaby sincerely believe in the morality of the cause he supports; he also commits to it so fully 
and forcefully that he quickly becomes the most earnest soldier that Dickens would ever create. 
Indeed, Dickens is explicit in establishing Barnaby’s faith in himself and faith in a movement 
that is infamous for the needless destruction that it caused: 
If ever man believed with his whole heart and soul that he was engaged in a just cause, 
and that he was bound to stand by his leader to the last, poor Barnaby believed it of 
himself and Lord George Gordon. (Dickens 390) 
As the above passage indicates, Barnaby’s spirit and morale were significantly stimulated by his 
involvement in these violent efforts. Exhibiting his full intent “to stand by his leader to the last,” 
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Barnaby even proves himself an ideal soldier when simply guarding a post, walking “with a 
measured tread,” possessed with “a brave sense of duty, and determination to defend it to the 
last”: in short, he was “the most devoted and the blithest champion that ever maintained a post” 
(Dickens 418). Though Barnaby Rudge is a fool, an unparalleled simpleton who demands 
sympathy from the reader, his sincerity cannot be denied. 
Discernibly, Dickens’s depiction of Barnaby successfully establishes his earnestness and 
validates the author’s interest in the theme of sincerity. Additionally, Dickens reinforces the 
import of sincerity by juxtaposing Barnaby with characters who are both artificial and insincere. 
Indeed, the author most overtly counters Barnaby with the aforementioned Hugh, yet his deep-
seated disingenuousness and his construction as a counterpart to Barnaby Rudge will be further 
analyzed in the ‘Counterparts’ chapter at the end of this section.  
Not excluding Hugh, the most disingenuous character in the novel is the devious Gashford, 
who is devoid of both principles and self-integrity. Though Lord George Gordon – Barnaby 
Rudge’s hero – is officially the highest in command in the movement responsible for the Gordon 
Riots, he in truth is no more than a figurehead. That is to say, while Lord George Gordon, 
historically speaking, was a demagogue and an advocate in high places, Dickens fictionalizes 
him to function as a simple-minded figurehead of the riots; in the novel, Gashford, not Gordon, 
is the proper leader of the Gordon Riots.  
Many scenes in the novel display the power and treachery of Gashford, particularly scenes in 
which he actively manipulates Lord George Gordon into trusting the uprightness of the men and 
movement that he leads. And many seemingly insignificant moments function to accentuate his 
artificiality, like those in which he bites his nails (a nasty habit symbolic of his nasty character) 
(Dickens 350) or smiles “as if for practice” (Dickens 279). Yet the scene that best encapsulates 
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Gashford’s insincerity is one in which another (much more likeable) character, Haredale, scolds 
the villain’s falsity in front of Gordon and hundreds of followers of his movement: 
This man…who in his boyhood was a thief, and has been from that time to this, a servile, 
false, and truckling knave: this man, who has crawled and crept through life, wounding the 
hands he licked, and biting those he fawned upon: this sycophant, who never knew what 
honour, truth, or courage meant…(Dickens 343) 
Though Haredale attacks a number of Gashford’s qualities in the above passage, it is readily 
apparent that he is especially critical of his disingenuousness, not only labeling him as “false” 
and devoid of honor and truth, but reminding him and the reader of the fickleness and dishonesty 
with which he had treated others, “wounding the hands he licked, and biting those he fawned 
upon” (Dickens 343). These condemnations reinforce sincerity as one of the predominant themes 
of the novel, and obligate the reader to more carefully consider what separates the bad characters 
from the good. If Gashford’s wickedness is principally rooted in his insincerity, it makes perfect 
sense that Barnaby Rudge’s goodness is rooted in the opposite.  
  
A Tale of Two Cities  
Men who are thoroughly false and hollow, seldom try to hide those vices from 
themselves; and yet in the very act of avowing them, they lay claim to the virtues they 
feign most to despise. ‘For,’ they say, ‘this is honesty, this is truth. All mankind are like 
us, but they have not the candour to avow it.’ The more they affect to deny the existence 
of any sincerity in the world, the more they would be thought to possess it in its boldest 
shape; and this is an unconscious compliment to Truth on the part of these philosophers, 
which will turn the laugh against them to the Day of Judgment. (Dickens 184)  
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The above passage encapsulates Dickens’s paraphrased interpretation of a book written by Lord 
Chesterfield, who is the favorite author of another utterly false and artificial character in Barnaby 
Rudge, Ned Chester. Notably, the passage carries a reproachful tone; Dickens precedes it with 
the devilish Chester’s giddy declaration that Lord Chesterfield himself is a product of the Devil 
(Dickens 184). Nevertheless, the reader may wonder if the author was minimally inspired by the 
words of Chesterfield in shaping the iconic character of Sydney Carton.  
Carton is not a man who attempts to “deny any sincerity in the world,” or feigns to 
despise the virtues apparent in the lives around him; rather, he envies the morality of others, and 
wishes that he could better himself so that he could match them in character. Yet, a bit like 
Chester’s convictions, Carton very clearly does not attempt to hide his own vices from himself, 
often reciting them to others and thus lowering himself into a self-pitying vat of despair. But it is 
this very act of avowing his own defects that ultimately enables him to lay claim to his own 
virtues, and become morally and intellectually transformed. Indeed, the emphasis Dickens places 
on Carton’s recognition of his own shortcomings mirrors a facet of Carlyle’s argument from On 
Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History: that “[t]he greatest of faults…is to be 
conscious of none.” Carton is hyperaware of his deep-seated flaws and inefficiencies – for 
example, he asserts to his partner and friend Stryver that he is hopelessly “incorrigible” (Dickens 
145) – and Dickens ties this awareness to his sincerity, ultimately crafting a character whose 
chief strength is the earnestness with which he acknowledges his own weaknesses.  
The term ‘sincere’ is printed only once in the entirety of the novel, and it is far from 
fortuitous that it is uttered by the tale’s sole heroic figure, Sydney Carton: 
For you, and for any dear to you, I would do anything. If my career were of that better 
kind that there was any opportunity or capacity of sacrifice in it, I would embrace any 
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sacrifice for you and for those dear to you. Try to hold me in your mind, at some quiet 
times, as ardent and sincere in this one thing. (Dickens 158) 
In this passage, Carton is nearing the end of a lengthy soliloquy in which he reveals his long 
suppressed romantic feelings for and to Lucie Manette. Yet the passage’s significance surpasses 
its explicit role as a romantic confession: it also provides the reader with insight into Carton’s 
virtuous character, and anticipates his heroic action of sacrificing himself for the happiness of the 
woman he loves. In addition, it suggests the relationship between heroism and sincerity, as 
Carton is begging the object of his affections to recognize the sincerity of his words and thus the 
sincerity of himself. Indeed, this passage marks not only the first (and sole) time that the word 
‘sincere’ appears in the novel; it is the first instance in which the reader is made aware of the 
nobility and goodness that Carton represses, and which he is capable of expressing. In brief, the 
above dialogue captures the first moment in the novel when Sydney Carton reveals the true 
content of his character, and reveals it to be sincere – and thus heroic. 
Following this confession, the reader begins to see Carton differently; rather than 
representative of a hollowed misery and a defeatist attitude, his self-loathing is indicative of his 
sincerity. Because of this, his forthcoming heroic deed is not necessarily anticipated by the 
reader, but is presented as a more logical event in the novel, one that can be justified by Carton’s 
manifest heroism. The next time Carton visits the Manette residence, he is “not improved in 
habits, or in looks, or in manner” (Dickens 212). Indeed, he remains every bit as cognizant of his 
depraved character as he previously was, as made apparent in his exchange with Charles Darnay, 
a man similar to Carton in looks but different from him in every other regard:  
Sydney Carton: Now, you know me; you know I am incapable of all the higher and better 
flights of men. If you doubt it, ask Stryver, and he’ll tell you so. 
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Charles Darnay: I prefer to form my own opinion, without the aid of his. 
Sydney Carton: Well! At any rate you know me as a dissolute dog, who has never done 
any good, and never will. 
Charles Darnay: I don’t know that you ‘never will.’ 
Sydney Carton: But I do, and you must take my word for it. (Dickens 213) 
Carton’s romantic revelation is designed to dramatically alter the reader’s perception of his 
character, but not alter the character himself. The only regard in which Carton immediately 
changes is that he begins to act more discreetly, Darnay observing an apparent newfound 
“rugged air of fidelity” about the man in seeing him at his home (Dickens 212). Only Lucie 
Manette, greatly saddened by the emotionally exhausting conversation between herself and 
Carton, is able to perceive the nobility and goodness widening within him. In ruminating upon 
how Carton had thrown much of himself away but still had much great character left to exhibit, 
Lucie mourned “how much he every day kept down and perverted” (Dickens 158). Yet, even 
Lucie does not suppose that the sincerity apparent in Carton is indicative of his heroic status, 
though this reality will be revealed and reified in truly remarkable fashion at the novel’s end. 
 
Argument 2: Danger of Hero-Worship 
In December 1861, Charles Dickens learnt of the death of Prince Albert, and in response 
he postponed scheduled reading performances of his novel as a show of respect to the Queen of 
England, Queen Victoria. Yet, within a short period of time, Dickens declared the protracted 
mourning of the queen to be unhealthy, especially because Prince Albert was “‘neither a 
phenomenon nor the saviour of England’” but simply “‘the best sort of perfectly commonplace 
man!’” (Kaplan 447-448). 
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From these comments, one can conclude that Dickens certainly did not fawn over the 
royal family, or believe that relatives to the Queen of England were any better or worthier in 
character because of their royal heritage. This conviction parallels the cautious attitude that 
Dickens adopts when considering the notion of hero-worship in both Barnaby Rudge and A Tale 
of Two Cities. Indeed, while these novels mirror Carlyle’s rendering of the hero as a sincere 
figure, they dually approach Carlyle’s advocacy of the ardent worship of heroic figures with a 
formidable amount of skepticism. 
In On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History, Carlyle defines hero-worship 
as “transcendent wonder; wonder for which there is no limit or measure,” or, in short, to “admire 
without limit” (12). In clarifying this concept, Carlyle links hero-worship with an optimistic view 
of human nature: 
And what is notable, in no time whatever can they entirely eradicate out of living men’s 
hearts a certain altogether peculiar reverence for Great Men; genuine admiration, loyalty, 
adoration, however dim and perverted it may be…And to me it is very cheering to 
consider that no sceptical logic, or general triviality, insincerity and aridity of any Time 
and its influences can destroy this noble inborn loyalty and worship that is in man. 
(Carlyle 17) 
The above passage exhibits Carlyle’s personal admiration for a person’s “noble inborn loyalty” 
to “Great Men,” an admiration that he pronounces so fully that he even embraces a “dim and 
perverted” type of hero-worship. Perceptibly, Carlyle does not recognize any danger inherent in 
venerating another man so earnestly, even pronouncing that he is cheered by the impermeability 
of this reverence to any sort of potential influence.  
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Although Dickens placed enormous trust in the judgment of Carlyle throughout his life, 
his novels challenge this conception of hero-worship (Kaplan 177). Unlike Carlyle, Dickens 
recognizes the insufficiencies of hero-worship, including the possibility that the adulated “hero” 
may not be heroic at all, but rather a flawed or even immoral human being. Indeed, both A Tale 
of Two Cities and Barnaby Rudge illustrate how the enthrallment with a figure who does not 
deserve to be worshipped can cause the worshipper to lose his capacity as a moral agent. 
   
Barnaby Rudge 
…he felt a compelling desire to see his audience’s reaction to what he had written...Like 
an actor, he wanted the pleasure of spontaneous applause, the immediate confirmation of 
his command of other people’s feelings. (Kaplan 177)  
Dickens gained international fame as one of the most renowned writers of the Victorian 
era, but the author’s genuine passion lay in the theater. Although Dickens only acted on the stage 
intermittently, he enjoyed the profession tremendously and from it learned the magnetic power of 
an audience’s applause and acclaim. Indeed, instilled in Dickens from his earliest days as an 
author was a relentless fixation on the warm and exultant reception of his readership.  
Yet, while the author may have craved the worship of his readers, his novels reveal the 
suspicion with which he considered the concept of hero-worship. The passage below, for 
example, places Barnaby Rudge between men he naively views as “the most virtuous and 
disinterested heroes in the world,” and who are paradoxically two of the most devious characters 
in the novel: 
Hugh poised his steady arm aloft, and clapping Barnaby on the back, bade him fear 
nothing. They shook hands together – poor Barnaby evidently possessed with the idea 
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that he was among the most virtuous and disinterested heroes in the world – and 
Gashford laughed again. (Dickens 396) 
In his idiocy, poor Barnaby Rudge falsely reveres Hugh and Gashford, two of the novel’s 
greatest villains, in his belief that they are two of the world’s most benevolent and selfless 
heroes. This unfounded worship of two men who far from deserve it conveys Dickens’s 
skepticism of hero-worship, an attitude that is predominantly personified in the novel not by 
Hugh or Gashford, but by the character of Lord George Gordon. 
Dickens’s Gordon is a bumbling, incompetent politician who becomes the leader of a 
movement that bears his name under the sway of the devious Gashford, officially his assistant 
but more genuinely his puppet-master. Both the dominance Gashford exercises over his own 
“superior” and the sheer ignorance of this superior to comprehend his comparable weakness to 
his “inferior” is best illustrated in a dialogue featuring the two characters: 
Gashford: ‘…and waved your own and touched your sword; and when they cried, ‘No 
Popery!’ and you cried, ‘No; not even if we wade in blood,’ and they threw up their hats 
and cried, ‘Hurrah! not even if we wade in blood; No Popery! Lord George! Down with 
the Papists – Vengeance on their heads’ – when this was said and done, and a word from 
you, my lord, could raise or still tumult – ah! then I felt what greatness was indeed, and 
thought, When was there ever power like this of Lord George Gordon’s! 
Lord George Gordon: ‘It’s a great power. You’re right. It’s a great power!...But – dear 
Gashford – did I really say all that?’ 
Gashford: ‘And how much more!...Ah! how much more!’ (Dickens 280-282) 
Not only does the above passage demonstrate Lord George Gordon’s lack of heroism and 
susceptibility to Gashford’s manipulation, but it also functions as a social commentary on the 
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precariousness of adulation. As Dickens demonstrates in the above passage, opting to worship 
and idealize others can be utterly foolish and dangerous, not only because the target of worship 
can be enormously flawed and thus unworthy of such praise, but also because the act of 
worshipping runs the risk of becoming excessively romanticized and, as a result, reinforcing the 
false merits of the venerated person.  
Indeed, Dickens enforces these truths by informing the reader that Lord George Gordon 
is capable of being a good man, but his virtue becomes foiled by the unmerited adulation he 
receives as the leader of an immoral cause. Gordon is, like Barnaby Rudge, a fundamentally 
earnest character, “sincere in his violence and in his wavering”; he shares with Barnaby a sincere 
conviction in the uprightness of the ‘No Popery’ movement, and in his own abilities to lead it 
(Dickens 288). Yet, Gordon is led astray by the hazardous seduction of hero-worship, which is 
largely exemplified in a scene that occurs shortly before the commencement of violence in the 
novel, wherein Gordon first witnesses the unprecedented magnitude and morale of his followers 
and watches them as they all “burst into a tremendous shout…[while] the air seemed rent and 
shaken, as if by the discharge of cannon” upon his appearance. In response to this, he 
emotionally proclaims to Gashford: 
I am called indeed, now. I feel and know it. I am the leader of a host. If they summoned 
me at this moment with one voice to lead them on to death, I’d do it. Yes, and fall first 
myself. (Dickens 380) 
Gordon’s assertion that he is “the leader of host” echoes Milton’s portrayal of Satan in Paradise 
Lost, who was “cast…out from Heaven” with “his host of rebel angels” (Book 1, Stanza 1, Lines 
37-38) In paralleling Gordon with Milton’s Satan, Dickens is illustrating how boundless 
veneration can lead a man into falsely believing in the legitimacy of the applauded cause or 
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action – in this context the legitimacy of the ‘No Popery’ movement. Still, Gordon’s candid and 
sacrificial nature is appealing, his willingness to “fall first” himself signifying his potential to 
become a Carlyle or Dickensian brand of hero. But, what corrupts Gordon’s morality is the 
undue adulation he receives from his own followers and then receives again with an exaggerated 
flair from Gashford, for it produces in him “[a] nature prone to false enthusiasm, and the vanity 
of being a leader,” which Dickens labels as “the worst qualities apparent in his composition” 
(Dickens 288). The author thus invites the reader to recognize Gordon’s venality, and to mock 
the adorned heroic image of the character throughout the novel. 
 
A Tale of Two Cities 
Unlike Lord George Gordon in Barnaby Rudge, the object of undue worship in A Tale of 
Two Cities is not a character directly involved in the violence shaping the story’s action. In fact, 
the character in the novel who epitomizes not only the absurdity but also the danger of 
venerating others is one of the book’s more seemingly insignificant characters: Jerry Cruncher, a 
self-identified “honest tradesman” who works for Tellson’s Bank and weaves in and out of the 
main action of the novel.  
Jerry Cruncher reigns as his eponymous son’s “honoured parent” (Dickens 166), which is 
illustrated at many points in the novel, like when Young Jerry gazes at his father with “twinkling 
eyes…restlessly watchful of him,” as he vulgarly “bit and spat out straw” (Dickens 63). But what 
makes Young Jerry’s adulation of his father especially disconcerting is not merely that Cruncher 
is a relatively unintelligent and inconsequential man who far from merits the adoration he 
receives. Cruncher frequently physically and verbally abuses his wife largely because her ardent 
religious devotion confuses and upsets him, thus setting a toxic precedent for his son (Dickens 
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61). Dickens poignantly captures how powerfully Cruncher’s cruel treatment of his wife 
impresses upon Young Jerry, who was actually “touched” when Cruncher brutally castigates his 
wife for failing to properly care for him (Dickens 165): 
This touched Young Jerry on a tender place; who adjured his mother to perform her first 
duty, and, whatever else she did or neglected, above all things to lay especial stress on the 
discharge of that maternal function so affectingly and delicately indicated by his other 
parent. (Dickens 165) 
Accordingly, Young Jerry’s steady admiration of his father compels him to disobey the 
orders he had been given to go to bed on that same night. He chooses to follow his father out into 
the night, “[i]mpelled by a laudable ambition,” to, as Dickens satirically phrases it, “study the art 
and mystery of his father’s honest calling” (165). But, while he expected to simply spot his father 
fishing with some of his other adult comrades, Young Jerry instead discovers him illegally 
entering a cemetery and digging up a buried casket. Severely frightened after seeing his father, 
the grave robber, holding up the remnants of a corpse, Young Jerry immediately bolts. As he 
runs home, he remains traumatized to the extent that he feels the presence of the skeleton 
following him into the night: 
He had a strong idea that the coffin he had seen was running after him; and, pictured as 
hopping on behind him, bolt upright, upon its narrow end, always on the point of 
overtaking him and hopping on at his side – perhaps taking his arm – it was a pursuer to 
shun. It was an inconsistent and ubiquitous fiend too, for, while it was making the whole 
night behind him dreadful, he darted out into the roadway to avoid dark alleys, fearful of 
its coming hopping out of them like a dropsical boy’s-kite without tail and wings. 
(Dickens 167) 
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This episode conveys Dickens’s understanding of how the moral conscience works, 
wherein the repressed event always eventually rises to the surface of one’s mind. This “pursuer 
to shun” and “inconsistent and ubiquitous fiend” appears to be symbolic of more than the 
deceased villain of Young Jerry’s imagination; these epithets dually characterize the villain 
present in Young Jerry’s reality, a father ubiquitous in his life who both merits shunning and is 
his himself a prolific shunner, and tends to speak to others with an “unconscious inconsistency” 
(Dickens 60). That Dickens has re-envisioned Cruncher as an indomitable motif connotative of 
death better speaks to the mistrust with which Dickens considers the notion of hero-worship than 
perhaps any other example or passage written in the novel.  
Yet, quite strikingly, Dickens does not allow for this experience to tarnish Young Jerry’s 
steady worshipping of his father. The following morning, in fact, Young Jerry not only regains 
his courage, but transforms in both disposition and outlook: he becomes “a very different Young 
Jerry from him of the previous night…[h]is cunning was fresh with the day, and his qualms were 
gone with the night” (Dickens 169). Despite the misgivings which he may have had about his 
father’s skeleton-stealing profession only hours before, he eagerly inquires about it the next day 
and ultimately exclaims that he would “so like to be a resurrection-man when I’m quite growed 
up” (Dickens 169)! 
Jerry Cruncher and his son may not be the central characters in A Tale of Two Cities, but 
their presence in the novel is not perfunctory. It works structurally and metaphorically to 
establish a set of values that is essential to a novel that centers on the tragic events of the French 
Revolution, the rendering of which is largely shaped by Carlyle’s French Revolution (Kaplan 
415), a text that elicits a “darkly tragic view of the human condition” (Rosenberg xx). Indeed, 
Carlyle’s book, which is a fictionalized but fact-based interpretation of the French Revolution, 
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describes the Revolution as “the politics of aggression by ingestion” wherein “society rests on 
the primitive political fact ‘that I can devour Thee’” (Rosenberg xx). 
It is thus all the more disturbing that Young Jerry’s resolute adulation of his father 
mirrors the very nature of the revolutionaries, who like Young Jerry are made to bear witness to 
the corruption and morbidity surrounding them. And like Young Jerry, they accept these 
circumstances as they are because of their irreparable faith in the leader(s) that have produced 
such horror. Yet for them it is a vindictive cause, rather than a vindictive man, that they choose 
to venerate. 
 
Analysis of Edification  
How is Dickens’s alignment of these characters with Carlyle’s taxonomy of heroism, as 
well as his rejection of hero-worship, connected with the characters’ eventual edification in the 
novels? One explanation lies in Carlyle’s emphasis of the mental acumen of heroes, or heroes’ 
capacity to form great thoughts. As Covert argues, Carlyle’s conception of greatness “does not 
come from deeds”; heroes are born “from their thoughts, their philosophizing,” and the “new 
theories that they introduce into the world.” According to Carlyle, the advancement of our world 
today equates with the realization of the thoughts of great men: 
…the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of 
men contrived to do or to attain; all things we see standing accomplished in the world are 
properly the outer material result, the practical realisation and embodiment, of Thoughts 
that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world. (Carlyle 3) 
Indeed, Carlyle is more concerned with man’s cerebrum than with man’s strength. As Covert 
argues, what differentiates “Carlyle’s theory of what makes a man a great man” from the 
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conventional definition of greatness is that his idea of man is one who “only need express his 
thoughts in a good way.”  
Thus, the weight Carlyle places on the mental faculty of heroes elucidates the edification 
of Dickens’s Carlyle-type heroes, considering that edification is an intellectual and moral 
transformation, or a transformation that is concentrated in the psyche and conscience. Moreover, 
Dickens rejects Carlyle’s support of hero-worship in his belief that human improvement should 
be an internalized process rather than an adoption of a mere social posture. In other words, as 
illustrated by the characters of Lord George Gordon and Young Jerry, Dickens believes that 
hero-worship can impede the edification of individuals. In the case of the former, Gordon falsely 
interprets the admiration he receives as evidence of his own high self-worth; in the latter, Young 
Jerry’s admiration for his father falsely convinces him of Cruncher’s high self-worth. In both 
instances, Dickens explicitly exemplifies each character’s underlying goodness to underscore 
hero-worship as a force that deters them from improving themselves either morally or 
intellectually. 
In what follows, I will analyze the edification of both Barnaby Rudge and Sydney Carton 
in their respective novels. 
 
Barnaby Rudge: The Edification of Barnaby Rudge 
The most heroic character in Barnaby Rudge is its eponymous protagonist. While the 
novel’s title admittedly hints at this heroism being made apparent at some point in the narrative, 
the fact that Barnaby Rudge is the champion of his own novel seems quite unprecedented from 
its start. The reader first encounters Barnaby as he echoes rather than attempts to alleviate the 
cries of a wounded man lying in the streets. Within moments it is made clear that the character is 
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not only somewhat incompetent in terms of his ability to help others, but is mentally 
handicapped, Dickens describing him as an individual whose face was “strangely lighted up by 
something that was not intellect” (35-36).  
 Moreover – quite opposite to Sydney Carton – Barnaby Rudge does not commit some 
astoundingly courageous or self-sacrificial deed that substantiates his heroism. In stark contrast, 
he unwittingly joins an egregious social movement and actually aids in spreading far-reaching 
and needless destruction to the city of London. Yet, as previously established, because the 
character boasts an unequivocally sincere heart and demeanor, Dickens creates him with the 
intention to have him serve as his novel’s Carlyle-approved hero.  
Moreover, Barnaby Rudge is not just a hero, but an edified hero following his 
participation in the violent Gordon Riots. Yet, the question still lingers: if edification is a 
transformation oriented in the mind, how can a character as base and simple-minded as Barnaby 
Rudge experience it?  Recall that in the framework of this Thesis, edification encompasses both 
moral and intellectual enlightenment, which can be attained both through action and through 
speech. Barnaby largely becomes enlightened as a result of his actions, particularly his 
involvement in the Gordon Riots. 
The structure of the novel enables Barnaby Rudge to become intellectually transformed 
in that he acquires a proper understanding of his distinct purpose in the reality in which he 
dwells. Dickens deliberately informs the reader at the novel’s end that the character not only 
becomes “more rational” following the riots, but also retains “a better memory,” and, most 
significantly, “a greater steadiness of purpose” (Dickens 647). Yet, what precisely is this 
purpose?  
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Throughout the novel, Barnaby is plagued by a persistent anxiety to make himself useful 
to others, especially to his mother. As a participant in the Gordon Riots, for example, Barnaby 
mistakenly believes that his mother would be overflowing with pride at the sight of her son 
marching in the protests: 
‘Wouldn’t it make her glad to see me at the head of this large show? She’d cry for joy, I 
know she would. Where can she be? She never sees me at my best, and what do I care to 
be gay and fine if she’s not by?’ (Dickens 384) 
Yet, what Barnaby isn’t fully aware of during the riots is that he already serves a substantial 
purpose in his mother’s life. He is a character defined by the indefatigable happiness and joy he 
receives from the most mundane facets of life: “in every tree, and plant, and flower, in every 
bird, and beast, and tiny insect whom a breath of summer wind laid low upon the ground, he had 
delight” (Dickens 367). And, as articulated best by Dickens, Barnaby’s “delight was hers”: his 
mother felt unparalleled levels of gratitude for her “poor light-hearted idiot” of a son, who “filled 
her breast with thankfulness and love” (367).  
Following the riots, Barnaby ascertains his purpose more clearly. He learns that he can 
please his mother by simply continuing to be a source of tireless happiness in her life, and by 
eternally remaining by her side. And in this he is successful, for by the novel’s end there has yet 
to be known an individual “with a blither or more happy soul than Barnaby,” and, moreover, 
“though he was free to ramble where he would” he chose to never leave his mother, and “was for 
evermore her stay and comfort” (Dickens 648). While Barnaby is a highly naïve and innocent 
character, both the protagonist’s essential happiness and his conscious decision to remain by his 
mother’s side represent the “greater steadiness of purpose” that he attains following the violence 
of the riots. 
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Barnaby’s happiness also demonstrates his moral transformation, wherein his self-
contentment is heightened following the paradoxically calamitous violence he experiences and to 
which he contributes. Despite being traumatized by the event, which comes to ineluctably 
symbolize a “dark cloud,” that “overhung his previous existence,” Barnaby manages to remain 
perfectly cheerful in nature (Dickens 647): 
He was not in the less happy for this [dark cloud], for his love of freedom and interest in 
all that moved or grew, or had its being in the elements, remained to him unimpaired. 
(Dickens 647-648) 
Barnaby’s uninhibited contentment extends beyond accomplishing Dickens’s desire for a 
sentimental end to his novel; it suggests that the author desires to reassure the reader that, despite 
the unmitigated violence and savagery that Barnaby had endured through his own actions, he 
emerges at the other end of it self-actualized and self-fulfilled. He emerges from it a man 
transformed entirely and incorrigibly for the better. Indeed, he emerges from it with an edified 
soul. 
 
A Tale of Two Cities: The Edification of Sydney Carton 
On the surface, Sydney Carton and Barnaby Rudge have close to nothing in common. 
Sydney Carton is a man whose strength is largely derived from his brutal awareness of his 
personal defects; Barnaby Rudge is oppositely empowered by his inability to acknowledge any 
of his individual flaws, which thereby enables him to view himself and the world through an 
irreparably optimistic lens. Yet, both characters share similar trajectories in their respective 
narratives, wherein each of them craves to be guided by some exceptional purpose and ultimately 
discover it as well as a keener sense of self-fulfillment. 
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It’s important to note that, while the edification of Sydney Carton is most overtly 
demonstrated by his actions – particularly the actions he takes to accomplish one overarching, 
sacrificial action – his speech equally produces and illustrates his improved state. 
Indeed, Sydney Carton undergoes both a moral and an intellectual transformation, 
discovering a purpose that is ultimately fulfilled and attaining an unprecedented level of self-
satisfaction in pursuing it. Still, this ambition is unavoidably fatal, as de Rougemont foresaw it to 
be in asserting that the passion of characters inspired by the European romantic period requires 
“death to be the end of all things”: Carton arranges for his own execution by the French 
revolutionaries in place of Charles Darnay, the husband of his beloved Lucie Manette (Dickens 
260). Regardless of the heart-rending ends of his pursuit, Carton pursues it nonetheless, and dies 
an edified man. 
Carton’s edification becomes apparent to the reader rather quickly, for after he settles 
upon sacrificing himself to the guillotine the characteristics previously labeled as Carton’s faults 
and follies are suddenly rewritten as his strengths and assets. For example, earlier in the novel 
Charles Darnay had identified Carton as “a problem of carelessness and recklessness” (Dickens 
214). Yet, while executing his self-sacrificing scheme, Carton addresses Mr. Barsad, an English 
turncoat of the French revolutionaries, and actually exploits his “negligent recklessness of 
manner” to augment “his quickness and skill,” and thus to deftly blackmail Barsad into granting 
him entrance into the prison cell where Darnay is being detained until his execution (Dickens 
307). In this transaction, one of Carton’s greatest faults has been transmuted into an asset that 
ironically enables Carton to save Darnay’s life. 
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 Furthermore, shortly after the scene mentioned above, Carton exchanges a few words 
with Jarvis Lorry, a dear friend of the Manettes, which exemplify his changed but constant 
manner: 
‘You are a good man and a true friend,’ said Carton, in an altered voice. ‘Forgive me if I 
notice that you are affected. I could not see my father weep, and sit by, careless. And I 
could not respect your sorrow more, if you were my father. You are free from that 
misfortune however.’ 
Though he said the last words, with a slip into his usual manner, there was a true feeling 
and respect both in his tone and in his touch, that Mr. Lorry, who had never seen the 
better side of him, was wholly unprepared for. He gave him his hand, and Carton gently 
pressed it. (Dickens 318) 
Demonstrably, though Carton has a revealed a softer and more compassionate side of himself 
when addressing Lorry in the above passage, Dickens implores the reader to understand that 
these are characteristics that had always been present, but which Carton had chosen to suppress. 
Indeed, as Lorry deciphers in Carton’s self-pitying language, Carton still preserves “his usual 
manner,” signifying that his transformation has not wholly eradicated his former demeanor, but 
merely uplifted it.  
Importantly, what is responsible for Carton’s improvement is the acquisition of a greater 
degree of self-contentment. For example, when lounging in the Manette residence for the last 
time before he would sacrifice himself, there was “an air about him that was not all of pity – that 
had a flush of pride in it” (Dickens 345). Furthermore, when Carton finally enters the jail cell of 
Charles Darnay, preparing to drug the man in order to save his life and lose his own, Dickens 
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writes that “[t]here was something so bright and remarkable in his look that, for the first moment, 
[Darnay] misdoubted him to be an apparition of his own imagining” (Dickens 360).  
Carton is morally transformed in that he acquires a profound sense of self-fulfillment as a 
direct result of his decision to sacrifice himself. That Sydney Carton sacrifices himself in his love 
for Lucie Manette illustrates de Rougemont’s characterization of a “hero who serves for love” as 
“the primary and invariable motif from which erotic fantasy will always start” (249): 
It is a sensuality transformed into the craving for self-sacrifice, into the desire of the 
male...to suffer and to bleed for his lady-love. The expression and the satisfaction of desire, 
from having both seemed unattainable, were transmuted into something loftier -- a heroic 
action undertaken for the sake of love. Death thereupon became the only alternative to the 
fulfillment of desire, and in any event release seemed absurd. (de Rougemont 249) 
In his knowledge of the unattainability of Lucie’s love, Carton turns to the best alternative that he 
could perceive: death. And, in choosing death, Carton’s passionate desire is indeed “transmuted 
into something loftier,” which is corroborated by the level of self-fulfillment that he attains and 
that had never before seemed feasible to him.  
Yet, Carton is also intellectually transformed in the sense that he attains a purpose that he 
is fixedly resolved to meet, the purpose being to forego his own life in order to save that of Charles 
Darnay. Indeed, Dickens is quite explicit in equating Carton’s self-sacrificial desire with the 
pursuit of his true purpose. In his transformed state, Carton begins walking with “a braced purpose 
in the arm and kind of inspiration in the eyes,” symbolizing the purpose towards which he was 
moving and to which he was eagerly looking (Dickens 308). Likewise, Carton openly lingers upon 
the painful notion of a pointless or misused life in various discussions after he has internally 
decided to secure his own execution. When urging Doctor Manette to continue pressing those who 
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had sentenced his son-in-law to death to allow him to evade execution, Carton mutters: “[o]f little 
worth as life is when we misuse it, it is worth that effort” (Dickens 346). Moreover, in the passage 
below, Carton asks Lorry a poignant and hypothetical question touching upon what he interprets 
as the basic foundations of a life well lived: 
If you could say, with truth, to your own solitary heart, to-night, ‘I have secured myself the 
love and attachment, the gratitude or respect, of no human creature; I have won myself a 
tender place in no regard; I have done nothing good or serviceable to be remembered by’; 
your seventy-eight years would be seventy-eight heavy curses; would they not? (Dickens 
320) 
Indeed, Carton’s question validates his perception of a life devoid of both the natural empathy of 
others and a steady willingness to benevolently serve others as not only meaningless but 
blasphemous. Yet, while Lorry answers in the affirmative, what he is unaware of is that Carton 
has discovered a means through which he can secure these ends that are essential to leading a life 
worth living. And, in completing these ends, Carton posthumously reassures the reader of the lack 
of remorse he feels for choosing to pursue a fatalistic purpose rather than to continue to live a futile 
life, for Carton dies with “the peacefullest face…ever beheld” at the guillotine (Dickens 385), and 
utters the iconic final words of the novel: 
It is a far, far better thing that I do, than I have ever done; it is a far, far better rest that I 
go to than I have ever known. (Dickens 386) 
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Counterparts 
The novels are full of twins and opposites, but in the crisis of conversion the mirror is 
offered to the character, in effective mime and therapy, as well as to the reader in irony 
and generalization. The mime is simple, but its implications are many. (Hardy 32) 
There are several reasons why authors may choose to create a character who largely 
functions to parallel or complement another character. As discussed by Hardy, who analyzes the 
utility of the many counterparts interwoven into Dickens’s novels, these counterparts or “twins 
and opposites” often create a sentient mirror for a character, compelling them to come to terms 
with their own ontology “in effective mime and therapy.” Additionally, Hardy also argues that 
Dickens creates counterparts in an effort to stimulate a particular, often ironic, reaction from the 
reader.  
While Dickens incorporates counterparts into both Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two 
Cities, it is impossible to definitively state each and every motive he had to shape these mimetic 
characters. Yet, I argue that, in the context of these two novels, Dickens creates characters who 
counter Barnaby Rudge and Sydney Carton to at least partially anticipate and reinforce these 
characters’ ultimate edification. In other words, these counterparts, in both direct and indirect 
ways, function to emphasize and/or advance a trajectory that results in the principal characters’ 
edification. 
 
Barnaby Rudge 
After completing an initial reading of Barnaby Rudge, it may seem altogether 
unfathomable that any other character in the novel serves as a counterpart to its eponymous 
protagonist, who is unmatched in spirit and sheer energy. Yet, from close examination, one can 
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decipher small yet significant similarities between Barnaby Rudge and Hugh, a lowly and 
deceitful worker at the Maypole Inn who manipulates Barnaby into participating in the Gordon 
Riots.  
Though in attitude the two characters starkly oppose one another, they share peculiar 
similarities in terms of their mental capacities. Although Barnaby is the sole of the two 
characters who is mentally handicapped, both are intriguingly described as deficient in 
“imagination” by the same man, John Willet:  
 [Barnaby] wants imagination…that’s what he wants. (Dickens 92) 
…there an’t a better man in England that is that Maypole Hugh yonder…but if that chap 
had only a little imagination, sir—. (Dickens 229) 
Furthermore, both Hugh and Barnaby Rudge act as pawns in the novel; characters superior to or 
more knowledgeable than they use them in order to advance their own nefarious actions and 
goals. Although at first glance it may not appear that Hugh is a pawn at all, given that he – unlike 
Barnaby – is much more cognizant of the consequences and gravity of his actions, he in fact 
consciously welcomes the prospect of being used, telling Ned Chester that he can use him as he 
likes, for he has little concern for “what the end is” or what the ramifications of his actions are 
(Dickens 319).  
But, counterparts do not necessarily exclusively share similar qualities; they can also act 
as each other’s complements or equivalents by differing from one another in critical ways. 
Indeed, in complete contrast to Barnaby, Hugh is immune to the persuasive appeal of hero-
worship, and actually reconstructs the whole concept of heroism in viewing it from his own 
farcical perspective. This is best exemplified in his decision to become one of Simon Tappertit’s 
followers, another man he tells can “[m]ake anything [he] like[s]” of him (Dickens 309):  
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The bare fact of being patronized by a great man whom he could have crushed with one 
hand, appeared in his eyes so eccentric and humorous, that a kind of ferocious merriment 
gained the mastery over him, and quite subdued his brutal nature. (Dickens 309) 
What exactly is achieved in creating such a parallel for the protagonist? As the above passage 
demonstrates, counterparts can augment a specific truth or meaning in the novel that is dually 
expressed through the character that they parallel. The absurd and facetious way in which Hugh 
views the adulation of a hero or “great man” perfectly matches the uneasiness with hero-worship 
that Dickens implicitly expresses throughout the novel. Although Barnaby’s accidental affiliation 
with the riots and his steadfast faith in Lord George Gordon surely makes such an uneasiness 
known to the reader, Hugh’s evisceration of the notion of heroism undoubtedly reinforces it. 
Moreover, in intriguing ways, Hugh’s existence in the novel actually reifies and enhances 
the morality and eventual edification of Barnaby Rudge. This is most powerfully seen in a 
dialogue exchanged between the two characters when they are imprisoned together following the 
riots, awaiting their impending execution: 
‘What cheer, Barnaby? Don’t be downcast, lad…’ 
‘Bless you,’ cried Barnaby, stepping lightly towards him, ‘I’m not frightened, Hugh. I’m 
quite happy. I wouldn’t desire to live now, if they’d let me. Look at me! Am I afraid to 
die? Will they see me tremble?’ 
Hugh gazed for a moment at his face, on which there was a strange, unearthly smile; and 
at his eye, which sparkled brightly…(Dickens 606) 
The above passage does not capture the edification of Barnaby Rudge, but it certainly mirrors 
and foresees it in that it illustrates a profound degree of self-fulfillment and contentment in 
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Barnaby, as well as his astoundingly astute understanding of the perilous fate awaiting him, 
which he embraces as a purpose he is destined to fulfill.  
Barnaby’s lofty soul is heightened by the presence of Hugh in the jail cell. For, like 
Barnaby, Hugh is not intimidated by death in the slightest; in fact, earlier in the novel he 
proclaims that he’s “never been sorry for a man’s death” in all of his life (Dickens 172). Yet, 
what overtly separates the two characters is the indefatigable devotion of Barnaby to a movement 
he still believes to be righteous in character; as he stood there in the prison cell he still wore the 
‘No Popery’ movement’s insignia: a hat adorned with broken peacock feathers (Dickens 606). 
According to Vanden Bossche, Carlyle emphasizes sincerity as that which makes a hero great, 
for sincerity “has a touch of godliness in it.” If ever such a godliness was revealed in the heart of 
a sincere character, it was in that of Barnaby, who stood in a prison cell sporting luminescent 
eyes and “a strange, unearthly smile” as he awaited an untimely death – from which he is 
ultimately pardoned. Instead of meeting his death, Barnaby is brought “home in triumph,” and 
instead met with the jubilant faces of scores of London citizens who “cheered with all their 
might” for the preserved life of the heroic figure (Dickens 624). 
 
A Tale of Two Cities 
Unlike the characters of Barnaby Rudge and Hugh, Sydney Carton and Charles Darnay 
do not demand meticulous analysis in order to substantiate that they function as counterparts in A 
Tale of Two Cities. Dickens constructs the two characters to be nearly identical in appearance, as 
their interchangeability enables the final event of the novel – wherein Carton surreptitiously 
substitutes himself to be executed in Darnay’s place – to occur realistically. Yet, there are 
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numerous other objectives Dickens sought to accomplish in paralleling these two characters, 
including Darnay’s function to both embolden and anticipate Carton’s edification. 
The reader first meets Sydney Carton and Charles Darnay in the same scene of the novel, 
where they appropriately sit opposite one another in an English courtroom. All attention in the 
room is fixed on Darnay, a prisoner standing trial for treason, while Carton is all but physically 
absent as his counsel, subsisting in a determined sort of silence as the trial proceeds, his eyes 
concentrated on “the ceiling of the court” (Dickens 79). Yet, while Carton’s “careless and 
slovenly if not debauched” appearance outwardly suggests his uselessness in the trial, it is he 
who ultimately wins the case in favor of his defendant and thus prevents Darnay’s execution. To 
accomplish this, he simply hands his co-counsel, Stryver, a small, handwritten note suggesting 
that he confuse the witness he is cross-examining by establishing the physical likeness between 
Carton and Darnay: 
Stryver: ‘Did you ever see anybody very like the prisoner?’ 
Not so like (the witness said) as that he could be mistaken. 
Stryver: ‘Look well upon that gentleman, my learned friend there,’ pointing to him who 
had tossed the paper over, ‘and then look well upon the prisoner. How say you? Are they 
very like each other?’ 
Allowing for my learned friend’s appearance being careless and slovenly if not 
debauched, they were sufficiently like each other to surprise, not only the witness, but 
everybody present, when they were thus brought into comparison. (Dickens 79) 
Indeed, in making not only the witness but also the entire courtroom aware of the uncanny 
resemblance that Carton bears to Darnay, the confidence of the witness is smashed “like a 
crockery vessel,” his part of the case reduced “to useless lumber” (Dickens 79). In effect, Carton 
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upsets the prosecution’s case for unquestionably identifying Darnay as the spy spotted by the 
authorities, winning the freedom of his counterpart.  
 Yet the significance of this event in the novel extends far beyond its advancement of the 
plot, wherein Darnay is set free and Carton is established as the aesthetic double who sets him 
free. For one, the scene concurrently signifies the repressed utility of Carton and foreshadows the 
novel’s conclusive event, in which Carton yet again saves the life of Darnay by sacrificing 
himself in his place – an action he accomplishes as a result of their interchangeable appearances. 
Simultaneously, it shapes the dynamic between Carton and Darnay that persists throughout the 
novel – Carton as an introverted, impudent figure so certain of his own inconsequentiality that he 
enables his co-counsel to articulate the pivotal discovery that he himself had made, and Darnay 
as the singular object of attention and concern, who exclusively wins widespread congratulations 
for “his escape from death” (Dickens 84). Indeed, this stilted dichotomy between the role each 
character plays in the same reality – Carton that of the loser, and Darnay that of the victor – is 
one that ultimately drives Carton to once again save the life of Darnay, but this time by ending 
his own.  
Still, the presence of Charles Darnay in the novel does not simply foreshadow the 
eventual edification of Carton; it also incites it. Throughout the novel, Dickens clearly 
distinguishes Darnay as a man who actualizes all that Carton is not, and all that he aspires to be. 
A man of French genealogy, Darnay becomes “a higher teacher of the French language,” and is 
prized throughout the English community due to both the scarcity of individuals in his profession 
and the earnest diligence with which he educated his students: 
As a tutor, whose attainments made the student’s way unusually pleasant and profitable, 
and as an elegant translator who brought something to his work besides mere dictionary 
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knowledge, Darnay became known and encouraged…with great perseverance and 
untiring industry, he prospered. (Dickens 135)  
By contrast, Carton receives no fulfillment or personal satisfaction from his occupation as a 
lawyer. After attending to Stryver’s papers for a number of consecutive, long nights, Carton 
evidently feels “none the livelier and none the soberer for so much application,” and adversely 
deteriorates to “a very damaged condition” as a result of drinking copious amounts of wine as he 
works (Dickens 143).  
Moreover, at the previously discussed trial, Darnay wins the unreserved sympathy and 
tears of Lucie Manette, a witness brought to the stand who gazed at the accused man with a 
“pity” that broke through her face of “earnest youth and beauty” (Dickens 75). Following the 
trial, Carton is not hesitant to express to Darnay how powerfully he envied him for being the 
recipient of such affections, asking him in a tone laced with sardonicism and bitterness if it was 
worth being tried for one’s life “to be the object of such sympathy and compassion” (Dickens 
88). 
Yet, Carton’s total lack of self-gratification extends beyond the indifferent attitude with 
which he approaches his job and his solitary life; as previously established, Carton does not feel 
a hint of contentment in any aspect of his life. Thus, in helping to acquit Darnay of his 
treasonous charges and perilous fate, he cannot relate to the relief the character must feel to re-
acquire his life: 
As to me, the greatest desire I have is to forget that I belong to [the world]. It has no good 
in it for me - except wine like this – nor I for it. So we are not much alike in that 
particular. Indeed, I begin to think we are not much alike in any particular, you and I. 
(Dickens 88) 
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Carton’s (however inebriated) deliberateness in differentiating himself from Darnay 
demonstrates each character’s function in the novel more effectively than any other passage in 
the novel. For embedded in Carton’s words is not only the ardent longing to be similar to Darnay 
in respects separate from their corporeal identities, but a deeply ironic conviction that the most 
formidable difference between himself and Darnay is in their respective kinds of attachment to 
the world. For, as the reader will see, it is the depreciation with which Carton views the world 
that allows him to exit it so courageously, and hence become a man of even greater import than 
his counterpart.  
So, indeed, Carton is correct in that he is not alike at all to Darnay, and that he never will 
be – a truth reinforced by his last encounter with Darnay, in which Carton has changed so 
dramatically that he is not initially recognized by the man who bears his resemblance, Darnay 
misdoubting him as “an apparition of his own imagining” (Dickens 360). But, without the 
presence of Darnay in the novel, Carton is not only deprived of an ample means through which 
he can reify his own self-worth; he is deprived of a sentient being who, in epitomizing all of his 
potential, vigorously encourages him to not only actualize it, but to surpass it. That he does 
indeed surpass it is substantiated by a scene that perfectly encapsulates the resentment with 
which Carton views himself as a result of meeting Darnay: 
A good reason for taking to a man, that he shows you what you have fallen away from, 
and what you might have been! Change places with him, and would you have been 
looked at by those blue eyes as he was, and commiserated by that agitated face as he 
was? (Dickens 90) 
As the reader learns, when Carton does physically change places with Darnay, he in fact does not 
receive the same magnitude of sympathy from Lucie as her future husband had when put on trial 
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for treason. He earns a great deal more, coming to “hold a sanctuary” in the heart of Lucie and 
draw tears from her on each anniversary of his death. He becomes an edified being of greater 
worth than that which he ever sought, a man held more sacred in the souls of Darnay and Lucie 
Manette than they held each other (Dickens 386). 
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Section II: Rousseau & Tolstoy 
When historians analyze the origins of the French Revolution, they often begin with 
Rousseau’s On the Social Contract. Although the work is not necessarily a call to action, it 
presents the “fundamental claim that human beings are naturally good” and thus “that 
consequently there is no excuse for injustice” (Wootton xxix). This philosophy inspired the 
French revolutionaries to assemble, overthrow the French monarchy, and issue a decade of social 
and political upheaval and turmoil throughout the latter half of the 18th century.  
Although the French Revolution drives the plot of Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, Rousseau 
played a more substantial role in the life of Tolstoy than he did Dickens. Rousseau’s influence 
permeated Tolstoy’s life early on, Tolstoy in his youth listing both Confessions and Emile on a 
list denoting his most important literary discoveries (Troyat 57-58). French thinker Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau was the writer who “would influence him more than any other throughout his life,” and 
the writer he even admitted to loving and being “greatly indebted to” in 1905 (Briggs 17) Indeed, 
in 1901, Tolstoy donned a medallion around his neck with a picture of Rousseau tucked within it 
in place of a cross necklace (Briggs 17). Tolstoy’s attachment to Rousseau was “more than 
admiration or sympathy”; it was an “instant, enduring, ineradicable affinity” (Briggs 17).  
Briggs asserts that the ideas of Rousseau “have many parallels in Tolstoy’s work,” most of 
which were “instinctive” to him or natural for him to incorporate (17). In this paper I seek to 
engage with Briggs’s argument by claiming that Tolstoy brings into conversation ideas 
articulated in Rousseau’s On the Social Contract, as well as those in his essay entitled “The State 
of War,” in the narrative of his two great novels. In part, I will elucidate how the experience of 
war edifies Prince Andrey Bolkonsky and Count Pierre Bezukhov of War and Peace and why, 
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by contrast, soldier Alexei Vronsky of Anna Karenina abandons the war effort and descends into 
a state of dissipation.  
Three of Rousseau’s concepts are pertinent to my argument. First, I propose that Tolstoy 
engages with Rousseau’s argument that humans become warlike only after entering society and 
becoming susceptible to its corrosion by underscoring society as a primary factor in his 
characters’ decision to resort to violence and/or become soldiers. Additionally, I propose that 
Tolstoy establishes violence as an element of his characters’ moral and intellectual 
enlightenment, or edification, as a result of the manner in which Rousseau appeals to his 
admiration of the military profession. Particularly, Tolstoy engages with both Rousseau’s 
reasoning that men are incapable of causing war, and his portrayal of an ideal virtuous 
environment as analogous in nature to a military environment. 
In summary, in this portion of the paper I intend to analyze these aspects of Rousseau’s 
theory in order to show how they are exemplified in the narratives of Tolstoy’s War and Peace 
and Anna Karenina. 
 
Argument 1: Influence of Society 
In his essay entitled “The State of War,” Rousseau argues that individuals are not of a 
naturally adversarial character, but are conditioned to act combatively only after falling prey to 
the influence of society (258): 
Man is naturally peaceable and timid; at the slightest danger his first movement is to flee; he 
becomes warlike only by dint of habit and experience…It is only after having entered into 
society with another man that he decides to attack someone else, and it is only after having 
been a citizen that he becomes a soldier. (Rousseau 258) 
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In Rousseau’s view, men are taught rather than inherently inclined to enter into combat with 
others, for the natural state of humans is one of both peace and timidity. Yet, in what regard does 
society trigger individuals to become combative? According to Rousseau, societies function as 
“a refuge” from the lawfulness of the state, where men form into “great bodies” and are “left to 
their own impulses” to “produce shocks…more terrible in proportion as their mass exceeds that 
of individuals” (259-260). Tolstoy appears to toy with this interpretation of society as that which 
instigates individuals to “attack someone else” in framing his characters’ perception of war in 
both Anna Karenina and War and Peace. In both of his novels, Tolstoy portrays society as a 
force that catalyzes his characters to become both violent in nature and commit themselves to the 
war effort.  
 
War and Peace 
Two male characters who are dissimilar in almost all respects, including their looks and 
dispositions, frame the backbone of War and Peace: Prince Andrey Nikolayevich Bolkonsky and 
Count Pyotr Kirillovitch Bezukhov, or Pierre for short.  
In being introduced to Andrey, the reader is immediately struck by how apathetically he 
views both Russian society and his pregnant wife: 
Obviously all the people in the drawing-room were familiar figures to him, and more than 
that, he was unmistakably so sick of them that even to look at them and listen to them 
was a weariness to him. Of all the wearisome faces that face of his pretty wife seemed to 
bore him most. With a grimace that distorted his handsome face he turned away from 
most. (Tolstoy 12) 
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The predominant reason why Andrey departs for war is because of the torpor he feels for an 
environment dominated by his elitist peers, an environment of which his wife is both a paradigm 
and a product. As he articulates to Pierre, a man who he singularly addresses with pleasantry and 
sweetness because of his similar nonconformity to this artificial environment (Tolstoy 12), he’s 
going to war both because he feels he feels he has to and because, as he states, “the life I lead 
here, this life is – not to my taste!” (Tolstoy 22). Discernibly, Andrey’s social position and his 
wish to abandon society altogether have compelled him to go to war; on both accounts, society is 
the leading factor which has driven him to combat. 
Unlike Andrey, Pierre does not imagine himself entering war at the novel’s start, yet 
societal forces propel him into violence nonetheless. Although Pierre, similar to Andrey, longs 
for a change of environment, particularly one which discourages and corrects his “dissipated 
mode of life” (Tolstoy 26), his principles conflict with what he perceives as the purpose of the 
war: 
The war is now against Napoleon. If it were for freedom, I could have understood it, I 
would have been the first to go into the army; but to help England and Austria against the 
greatest man in the world – that’s not right. (Tolstoy 21) 
Yet, Pierre’s disinclination to go to war does not cleanse his life of violence, for Pierre 
challenges another man, Dolohov, to a duel whilst Andrey is at war. It would be erroneous to 
equate this duel with Rousseau’s notion of war, as Rousseau accounts for the prevalence of 
violence in a social atmosphere, and differentiates such violence from what occurs within a 
genuine state of war. Indeed, a duel falls within Rousseau’s realm of social violence, and is an 
action that he typifies as “an accidental and particular war that can arise between two or more 
individuals” (258): 
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…and as for duels, provocations, cartels, calls to one-on-one combat, aside from the fact 
that they were an illegitimate and barbarous abuse of an entirely military constitutions, 
they did not result in a genuine state of war but in a private affair that was resolved within 
a limited time and place, such that, for a second fight to take place, a fresh call to arms 
was needed. (Rousseau 258)  
Although Rousseau argues that a man retains an inherent conviction or “natural law” that 
prohibits him from sacrificing “the life of his fellowman except to preserve his own,” he does 
recognize and strongly condemn the existence of quarrels in the civil state (258). Thus, in 
inciting a duel with Dolohov, Pierre is in fact still conforming to Rousseau’s interpretation of the 
civil state rather than entering into the true state of war to which Andrey committed himself. 
Still, it is the interference of members of society that entices Pierre to become violent within the 
civil state, and the morally dubious nature of society that incites him to enlist as a soldier in the 
Napoleonic Wars. 
Early in the novel, Pierre inherits the estate of his deceased father and suddenly becomes 
an object of interest to the upper hierarchy of Moscow, each day receiving “a great number of 
persons, who previously had not cared to be aware of his existence, but now would have been 
hurt and offended if he had not chosen to see them” (Tolstoy 181). Within a short period of time 
he weds Ellen, a woman widely considered the most beautiful of Russian society, but also a 
woman who is dissolute and wicked. That their marriage would be one saturated in dishonor, 
nastiness, and unnaturalness (Tolstoy 187) was apparent to Pierre before they even became 
engaged, yet – much like Tolstoy’s perception of the events of war – he felt it was inevitable, 
that it “had to be so and could not have been otherwise” (Tolstoy 192). Tolstoy is meticulous in 
foreshadowing the immorality of their marriage; once Pierre and Ellen have become officially 
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betrothed, the first comment Ellen makes to her fiancé is a request for him to remove his 
spectacles (192). The absence of Pierre’s spectacles symbolizes his loss of moral vision, and thus 
his descent into a blinded life of depravity and vice, which reaches its climax in the form of a 
duel instigated by societal gossip. 
Only months into his marriage, Pierre begins hearing murmurings of an affair between 
Ellen and a man named Dolohov. He even receives an anonymously written letter about the 
matter that references how blind he has become despite the spectacles that he dons: 
This unsettled question that worried him was due to the hints dropped by the princess, his 
cousin, at Moscow in regard to Dolohov’s close intimacy with his wife, and to an 
anonymous letter he had received that morning, which, with the vile jocoseness peculiar 
to all anonymous letters, had said that he didn’t seem to see clearly through his 
spectacles, and that his wife’s connection with Dolohov was a secret from no one but 
himself. (Tolstoy 281) 
Losing his temper at dinner one night, Pierre unthinkingly challenges Dolohov to a duel, and 
Dolohov willingly accepts. This duel is depicted as both senseless and foolish, particularly 
because Pierre is internally aware of the guilt of his wife and the “guiltlessness of Dolohov,” and 
even admits to Nesvitsky, his official second at the duel, that “it was awfully stupid” of him to 
lose his temper the way that he had (Tolstoy 283). Yet the duel is carried out nonetheless, 
Dolohov departing from it seriously but not fatally wounded, and Pierre free of any injury 
(Tolstoy 283).  
Although Pierre bitterly regrets this action, he emerges from it chastened and prepared to 
alter his life for the better. He cares little for how the duel has disgraced his name and honor, 
labeling such a disgrace “relative” and “apart from [him]self” (Tolstoy 287). What 
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predominantly concerns him is the dissolute qualities of Ellen, and “his most insincere love to 
her”; this concern provides him with the strength to separate from his wife, leaving her the 
revenue from his Russian estate and traveling alone to Petersburg (Tolstoy 288-289). Although 
Pierre’s confrontation with Ellen is verbally abusive and almost escalates into another violent 
scene, it does not escalate into another senseless catastrophe: Pierre is wearing his spectacles as 
the scene unfolds, signifying the replenishment of his moral sight (Tolstoy 288). And, indeed, 
free of his wife’s poisonous influence, Pierre does begin to lead an uplifted life, and to remember 
“how good it was to be virtuous” (Tolstoy 321): 
He reviewed his vicious past, and with an ecstatic sense of beginning anew, pictured to 
himself a blissful, irreproachfully virtuous future, which seemed to him easy of 
attainment. It seemed to him that he been vicious, simply because he had accidentally 
forgotten how good it was to be virtuous. (Tolstoy 321) 
This passage marks Pierre’s rediscovery of happiness, and eagerness to reinstitute morality into 
his life. In searching for virtue and pursuing this “path of regeneration” (Tolstoy 323), Pierre 
becomes a devotee of the Free Masonry religion, which in his view creates “quite a different 
Pierre, better than the one…in Petersburg” (Tolstoy 344).  
Although one may interpret Pierre’s transformation as the beginning stages of his 
edification, Pierre in fact has not yet become either intellectually enlightened, in which he would 
attain a more profound understanding of his own purpose and that of humankind, or morally 
enlightened, in which he would experience self-fulfillment or self-actualization. In truth, Pierre is 
“living just the same old life in different surroundings” (Tolstoy 347), and he still frequently 
feels himself “dissatisfied” and impatient “to do something for humanity” (Tolstoy 492). Still, 
the duel and progression of Pierre’s character in the novel is significant in that it parallels and 
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anticipates his eventual edification. For, similar to how he becomes a more content and goodly 
man following a notably violent incident, Pierre achieves edification only after enduring an 
epoch of pain and suffering brought upon by the violent circumstances of war. 
It must be re-emphasized that this duel is triggered by the influence of Moscow society, a 
realm brimming with individuals who insatiably crave both gossip and drama. Although one can 
argue that the violence is more directly triggered by Ellen’s adultery, her infidelity to Pierre is 
purposefully left ambiguous in the novel, Ellen informing her husband that “it’s not many a wife 
who with a husband like you wouldn’t have taken a lover, but I haven’t done it” (Tolstoy 289). 
Indeed, without the interference of society, composed of people hungry to inform Pierre of 
matters of no concern to anyone but himself and his wife, the duel would never have occurred. 
Eventually, Pierre imitates Andrey by choosing to go to war in order to escape from what 
Rousseau characterizes as “the great bodies” of society “left to their own impulses” (259-260). 
Driving home through Bolotny Square, Pierre stumbles upon a crowd “intently riveted” by the 
flogging of two Frenchmen accused of being spies (Tolstoy 690). Sickened by both the vulgarity 
and the spectacle of the deed, Pierre is suddenly overcome by “a sense of the urgent necessity of 
taking some step and making some sacrifice,” and becomes happily determined to depart for war 
as soon as possible and forego the privileges of his life as a Russian aristocrat (Tolstoy 691): 
He was conscious now of a glad sense that all that constitutes the happiness of life, 
comfort, wealth, even life itself, were all dust and ashes, which it was a joy to fling away 
in comparison with something else. (Tolstoy 691) 
Both the duel and Pierre’s delayed decision to enlist in the military illustrate the causal 
relationship Tolstoy constructs between society and violence. It is the coaxing and intrusive 
nature of society that encourages Pierre to prompt a duel with Dolohov, and the superficiality of 
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society displayed at Bolotny Square – a superficiality that encompasses “everything 
conventional, artificial, [and] human” that Pierre comes to loathe – that drives him to war 
(Tolstoy 821). Thus, it is far from coincidental that society is the predominant instigator of 
violence in Tolstoy’s epic novel and that Rousseau, one of his greatest influences, pinpoints 
society as a force which encourages man “to attack someone else” or become combative in 
character (258). 
 
Anna Karenina 
According to de Rougemont, for “some time before and after” 1490, Italian culture had 
“no small share of military glory” (251). With the growth of this glory, the art of war 
transformed to express an “admirably humane” culture, or “a profound ‘civilization,’”; indeed, 
wars effectually became civilized “to the full extent that such a paradoxical statement can be 
true” (de Rougemont 252). This notion that the military and warfare not only became normalized 
but widely venerated in 15th century Western culture mirrors the nature of the Russian culture 
captured in the pages of War and Peace and especially Anna Karenina, the narratives of which 
are by an aristocratic society that similarly lauded the military as an honorable career and war as 
emulative of a humane and advanced culture.    
In detailing the upbringing of Vronsky, Tolstoy emphasizes how strongly society 
influences his decision to pursue a career as a soldier. In fact, in first describing Vronsky in the 
novel, Tolstoy details him as someone who “had never known family life” (Tolstoy 56). From 
his birth, Alexei Vronsky is instead raised within social establishments that condition him to 
imagine himself as a soldier of great promise. Indeed, Vronsky “barely remembered his father” 
because he, as a child, was educated in the Corps of Pages, a military academy in imperial Russia 
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(Tolstoy 56). Moreover, following his graduation, Vronsky is quickly seduced by the society of 
Petersburg, which offered him a “luxurious and coarse life” (Tolstoy 56):  
Leaving school as a very young and brilliant officer, he immediately fell in with the ways 
of rich Petersburg military men. Although he occasionally went into Petersburg society, 
all his amorous interests lay outside it. (Tolstoy 56) 
This passage exemplifies Vronsky’s fervent acceptance as “a young and brilliant officer” by 
Petersburg society. Additionally, it demonstrates that Vronsky is initially effective in separating 
his romantic interests from his own professional ambitions, “all his amorous interests” lying 
outside of the Petersburg society in which he prospers. Thus, the passage anticipates a time in 
which Vronsky will fail to isolate his romantic life from his life as a soldier, and how this failure 
will result in the collapse of his burgeoning military career – and thus his identity.  
 Stephan Arkadyich, an acquaintance of Vronsky’s, describes him in a manner that closely 
mirrors the characterization above in that it intertwines his identity with the society of Petersburg 
and emphasizes the prestige of his position in the military: 
Vronsky…is one of the finest examples of the gilded youth of Petersburg. I got to know 
him in Tver, when I was in government service there and he came for the conscription. 
Terribly rich, handsome, big connections, an imperial aide-de-camp, and with all – a very 
sweet, nice fellow. And more than just a nice fellow. As I’ve come to know him here, 
he’s both cultivated and very intelligent. He’s a man who will go far. (Tolstoy 39) 
Vronsky’s community of peers certainly has high expectations of him that stem from their 
recognition of his status as a soldier. Furthermore, Vronsky’s peers likely admire him because he 
lives the fullness of his life with the same submissive and courteous disposition that a typical 
soldier reserves exclusively for combat. For example, although he admits to not respecting or 
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even loving his mother, “by his upbringing, he could not imagine to himself any other relation” 
to her “than one obedient and deferential in the highest degree” (Tolstoy 61).  
Vronsky’s martial character is further exemplified by a code of conduct he unwaveringly 
obeys. This code mirrors the medieval construction of a “system of forms and rules for the 
vehement emotions” that enables individuals to mitigate their passions, remain chivalrous and 
escape barbarity (de Rougemont 246). Vronsky shapes each facet of his life to conform to an 
unwritten code of aristocratic personal and societal conduct that “unquestionably defined 
everything that ought and ought not to be done” (Tolstoy 304): 
The code embraced a very small circle of conditions, but the rules were unquestionable 
and, never going outside that circle, Vronsky never hesitated a moment in doing what 
ought to be done. These rules determined unquestionably that a card-sharper must be paid 
but a tailor need not be, that one should not lie to men but may lie to women, that it is 
wrong to deceive anyone but one may deceive a husband, that it is wrong to pardon 
insults but one may give insults, and so on. (Tolstoy 304-305) 
Although these rules appear to be both contradictory and hypocritical, Vronsky’s consistent 
obedience to them keeps his life stable and predictable, and allows him to feel “at ease” and 
“hold his head high” (Tolstoy 305). Yet, once he begins to pursue an affair with the married 
Anna Karenina, Vronsky concludes that his code of conduct “did not fully define all 
circumstances,” and, moreover, that his relations with Anna lacked any semblance of “a guiding 
thread” (Tolstoy 305).  
Vronsky’s willingness to compromise his code of conduct exemplifies his willingness to 
compromise his relationship with society. For, while Vronsky is convinced that all of his peers 
“might know or suspect” his affair with Anna, he is determined to silence their gossip or 
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judgments and “make them respect the non-existent honour of the woman he loved” (Tolstoy 
305). The implications of this statement are clear: Vronsky is willing to resort to violence in a 
context separate from the battlefield in order to preserve his illicit relationship with Anna. In 
fact, he is openly impatient to be challenged to a duel by Anna’s husband, the cuckolded Alexei 
Alexandrovitch; it is a potential event that that Vronsky has prepared himself for “from the first 
moment” (Tolstoy 305): 
‘What a position!’ [Vronsky] thought. ‘If he’d fight, if he’s stand up for his honour, I’d 
be able to act, to express my feelings; but this weakness or meanness...He puts me in the 
position of a deceiver, which is something I never wanted and do not want to be.’ 
(Tolstoy 356) 
In retaining the chivalric view that duels produced “the triumph of one personality over 
another,” Vronsky desires to compromise his code of conduct, and hence compromise his own 
mode of existence (de Rougemont 252). The code of conduct that he has adhered to since birth 
epitomizes the martial demeanor that has been crafted and cultivated by the influence of society 
rather than by the influence of his family. Accordingly, his decision to renege on this code in 
order to retain his unlawful relationship with Anna begins to obscure the fragile line dividing war 
from society, as Vronsky becomes eager to dispose of a man whom he solely considers as 
“superfluous and interfering” rather than as a fully fleshed human being (Tolstoy 305). Indeed, 
Vronsky’s increasing inability to be obsequious to his own established rules demonstrates the 
division growing within himself between the promising soldier and the hedonistic lover. Because 
his militaristic ambitions “struggled with his love,” Vronsky soon resolves to sacrifice them for 
the happiness in his immoral love, a decision that irreparably alters himself and his relationship 
with society (Tolstoy 306). Evidently, Vronsky’s passion for Anna is too strong to be attenuated 
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by the code of conduct that he follows, a code he ironically followed to moderate his lustful 
passions (de Rougemont 246). 
Similar to Andrey and Pierre, societal influence compels Vronsky to become a soldier 
and go to war. Yet, unlike Andrey and Pierre, Vronsky replaces his commitment to the military 
with a corrupt and depraved sexual passion for a married woman. This is why Vronsky does not 
achieve edification by the novel’s end; on the contrary, he withers into a shadow of his former 
self, a man intent on going to war with the sole purpose of meeting his own death (Tolstoy 780).  
 
 
Argument 2: Natural Peacefulness of Humankind 
In War and Peace, Tolstoy argues on behalf of the absence of volition in persons who 
either fight in or attempt to control the course of war, mirroring Benjamin’s view of legal 
violence as a force born alone from “the uncertain, ambiguous sphere of fate” (295). Tolstoy 
establishes this argument through both his characters and through a narrative interwoven into the 
novel in which Tolstoy speaks directly to the reader. An example of the former is encompassed 
by a scene in which Andrey admires the leadership of his martial superior, General Kutuzov: 
He knows that there is something stronger and more important than his will – that is the 
inevitable march of events, and he can see them, can grasp their significance, and, seeing 
their significance, can abstain from meddling, from following his own will, and aiming at 
something else. (Tolstoy 684) 
Andrey feels protected under the direction of General Kutuzov not because he perceives him as a 
military genius, but because he understands that there are no military geniuses and can ascertain 
that Kutuzov understands this as well. Moreover, Andrey’s view of Kutuzov as an effective 
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general is not derived from how adept the general is at strategizing victories or in delegating 
martial duties; rather, Andrey believes Kutuzov is effective because he comprehends the 
inevitability of the “march of events” of war, and thus chooses to “abstain from meddling [and] 
following his own will” (Tolstoy 684). Instead of viewing war from an intellectual perspective, 
General Kutuzov maintains “the capacity for the calm contemplation of the course of events,” 
and in this he retains confidence that all to unfold before him “would be as it should be” (Tolstoy 
684).   
In an important narrative in War and Peace, Tolstoy presents his personal theories and 
misgivings about the origins and events of war in arguing that the events of war are predestined. 
Perhaps the passage which best encapsulates this viewpoint is one in which he uses the metaphor 
of an apple falling from a tree to represent the unfolding of war: 
When an apple has ripened and falls, why does it fall? Because of its attraction to the earth, 
because its stalk withers, because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, because 
the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing below wants to eat it? 
Nothing is the cause. All this is only the coincidence of conditions in which all vital organic 
and elemental events occur. And the botanist who finds that the apple falls because the 
cellular tissue decays and so forth is equally right with the child who stands under the tree 
and says the apple fell because he wanted to eat it and prayed for it. Equally right or wrong 
is he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and perished because 
Alexander desired his destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing a 
million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last time with his mattock. In 
historic events the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels 
they have but the smallest connection with the event itself. 
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Every act of theirs, which appears to them an act of their own will, is in an historical sense 
involuntary and is related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity. 
(Tolstoy 556) 
In equating the absence of a cause that can explain an action in nature to the absence of any logic 
that can explain the events of war, Tolstoy is adopting overtly histrionic and exaggeratory language 
to reinforce his view of war. Indeed, the absurdity of Tolstoy’s language demonstrates how 
dramatically and emphatically he rejects both the volition of humankind and the existence of 
heroism or greatness as potential rationalizations for the trajectory of history.  
While this position is a significant point of focus throughout War and Peace, it is also 
briefly established in Anna Karenina, despite the fact that the novel did not contain one scene of 
war:  
Sergei Ivanovich: On the one hand, war is such a beastly, cruel and terrible thing that no 
man, to say nothing of a Christian, can personally take upon himself the responsibility for 
starting a war. That can only be done by a government, which is called to it and is 
inevitably drawn into war. On the other hand, according to both science and common 
sense, in state matters, especially the matter of war, citizens renounce their personal will. 
(Tolstoy 805) 
In the above passage, Sergei Ivanovich, an academic philosopher in the novel and half-brother to 
Levin, dismisses the notion that men can start war by arguing that it is “a beastly, cruel and 
terrible thing” that is singularly initiated by government. He continues to argue that individuals 
“renounce their personal will” in war, and government officials do the same when handling 
matters related to war.  
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Although each of the analyzed passages has similarly illustrated Tolstoy’s rejection of 
men’s will in atmospheres of war, Ivanovich’s sentiments in particular are highly reminiscent of 
those of Rousseau. Like Tolstoy, Rousseau negates the idea that humans can exercise their will in 
actions that initiate or occur within war, stating in his Social Contact that “[i]t is the relationship 
between things and not that between men that brings about war” (161). This contention is recited 
and more intimately explained by Rousseau in “The State of War,” wherein he delineates these 
“things” as “states,” in asserting that “there is no war between men; there is war only between 
states” (260). 
Rousseau’s refusal to fault men for the incidence or atrocities of war suggests his ardent 
belief in the intrinsic goodness of humankind. Indeed, Rousseau emphasizes that individuals’ 
possession of the “natural law” repudiates the argument that the human species was “formed 
merely for mutual self-destruction” (258): 
If the natural law were inscribed only in human reason, it would hardly be capable of 
directing most of our actions, but it is also engraved in the heart of man in indelible 
characters, and it is there that it speaks to him more forcefully than do all the precepts of 
the philosophers; it is there that it cries out to him that he is not allowed to sacrifice the 
life of his fellowman except to preserve his own, and there that it makes him feel horror 
at spilling human blood not in anger, even when he finds himself obliged to do so. 
(Rousseau 258) 
As this passage demonstrates, Rousseau holds an optimistic view of humankind. He asserts that 
any man’s inclination to kill another man is strictly derived from his own sense of self-
preservation, and that, even in killing someone else in order to save their own life, individuals 
cannot escape from their conscience. Indeed, Rousseau does not attribute the cause, happenings, 
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or consequences of war to individuals, but to states, which are driven by “a manifest inclination 
to destroy the enemy state” or at least to diminish its relative power (264). Moreover, these states 
are not composed of individuals; they are inhabited by “public persons,” who Rousseau argues 
deviate entirely from “real men” (265):  
If there never were and never could be a genuine war between individuals, who then are 
those between whom it takes place and who can really call themselves enemies? I answer 
that they are public persons. And what is a public person? I answer that it is that moral 
being that is called “sovereign,” which has been given its existence by the social pact, 
and all of whose wills bear the name ‘laws.” (Rousseau 264) 
Not only does Rousseau equate a public person to a moral being, but he also describes this moral 
being as one who can be reduced to “a construction of reason” (265). In underscoring both the 
morality and rationality of the initiators of war, Rousseau is effectively legitimizing war and 
defending those involved in its occurrence.  
 In contrast to Rousseau, Tolstoy’s texts do not legitimize but re-evaluate the concept of 
war by questioning what historians presume to know about it; still, a component of Tolstoy’s re-
evaluation of war is the role played by individuals in initiating or controlling it, which is a 
perspective that engages with Rousseau’s refusal to fault men as those who cause war. This 
refusal is grounded in Rousseau’s steadfast belief in the natural non-combativeness of 
humankind. It is thus reasonable to argue that Tolstoy not only engages with Rousseau’s 
argument in support of the innocence of man despite his affiliation with war when shaping his 
belief in the absence of their will in war, but also engages with him in drawing a direct 
connection between inherent goodness and participants in war. This heightens the credibility of 
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my argument that Tolstoy draws a connection between virtue and the soldierly profession, which 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Argument 3: Portrayal of Virtuous Environments 
In the later stages of his life, Tolstoy’s writings become more deeply rooted in his fervent 
pacifism and anarchistic principles (Briggs 95). Yet, as a young and inexperienced man, Tolstoy 
followed his brother to the Caucasus to join the army, marking the period in his life in which he 
began to write, and particularly to write about war (Troyat 106). Tolstoy is notable for 
incorporating his own intellectual qualities into the characters he crafts, and Pierre and Andrey 
are no exception; as established in the Introduction of this paper, Tolstoy, like Pierre, first 
refused to go to war in his shared belief that its cause was not earnest enough (Troyat 62). Yet, 
like both Pierre and Andrey, Tolstoy opts to go to war partially because he sought an escape 
from the “debased world” in which he dwelt and for which he “felt nothing but contempt” 
(Troyat 72).  
Nonetheless, as a young soldier of 24, Tolstoy, in a diary that he kept with him in the 
regiment, censured war as “so unjust and ugly that all who wage it must try to stifle the voice of 
conscience within themselves” (Troyat 101). Tolstoy often yearned for solitude while at war, and 
was prone to blaming the other soldiers for “turning him aside from the path of goodness” on the 
occasions that he broke his personal code of conduct.  
All the while, however, Tolstoy couldn’t repress the evident admiration he felt for the 
soldiers whom he fought beside. For example, Tolstoy was impressed with his comrades’ 
apparent apathy to war to the extent that he cast soldiers in an otherworldly mold in his 
autobiographical story entitled The Raid (Troyat 103): 
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Joking, laughter, gay banter, gambling and drink expressed a universal indifference to the 
approaching danger. It was as though it were impossible to imagine that some of these men 
would not be coming back by this same road – it was as though all of them had already left 
the world long ago. (Troyat 81) 
Tolstoy’s veneration for his fellow soldiers is reinforced by his personal desire to emulate their 
fearlessness; he indicates in a diary entry dated on February 5, 1852 that he was not afraid of 
pain, but of not “being able to bear pain and death with dignity” (Troyat 91). As his time 
throughout the Caucasian War progresses, Tolstoy continued to emphasize how much he 
appreciated the fortitude of the men surrounding him, even pronouncing that he was thankful to 
God for granting him the opportunity to be a soldier: 
...there were one hundred and sixty wounded who refused to leave the ranks. These are 
noble days!...I have not had the good fortune to see action yet myself, but I thank God for 
allowing me to be with these people and live through this glorious time! (Troyat 120) 
Indeed, Tolstoy developed a great respect for the men in his regiment, admitting in a journal 
entry written in January 1854 that he had “unconsciously come to love the people he was about 
to leave, as well as the country” (Troyat 107). Still, Tolstoy was a man of two minds, retaining 
an attitude wrought with capriciousness and volatility. Less than two months before expressing 
the gratitude he felt for enlisting in the Caucasian War and befriending other soldiers, he wrote in 
a letter to his brother Sergei that his regiment consisted of “stupid officers, stupid conversations” 
(Troyat 106).  
Still, although Tolstoy was at times critical of the other men in his regiment, following the 
war he felt nothing but pride in his epoch as a soldier. This pride was demonstrated by the 
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attachment he felt to his uniform, and the struggles he underwent when readjusting to the 
banalities of civilian life:  
And, proud of his uniform, it annoyed him to see ‘drunken, nasty’ civilians trying to carry on 
like ‘true officers.’ For, although he claimed to loathe the military profession, he felt nothing 
but contempt for the townsmen in their dress suits who had never spent a night on sentry duty 
or seen a comrade shot down at their side. An inferior race, with stuffed paunches and 
sensitive behinds, pen-pushers, intriguers, clods. (Troyat 134-135) 
Indeed, regardless of the at times fickle attitude he expressed in his letters and diary entries, 
Tolstoy did not question the honor of the soldierly profession in the same way that he questioned 
the honor of war. In returning home, he felt a constant sense of self-satisfaction when reflecting 
on his time in the Caucasus; in fact, during a short period in which he stayed with his friend and 
fellow novelist Ivan Turgenev, he brought with him his sword “decorated with the ribbon of the 
Order of St. Anne” to adorn the front hall of the home, despite the fact that it was a home where 
he did not live (Troyat 135). He recited war stories when courting Sonya, his future wife (Troyat 
253), and when married to her he felt nostalgic for his life in war, envisioning himself “taking up 
arms to put down the rebels” who were leading an insurrection in Poland (Troyat 282). He even 
wrote to Russian poet and former soldier Afansay Fet to suggest that they might “have to take 
down [their] swords from their rusty nails” in response to “the Polish business” (Troyat 282). 
Tolstoy’s respect for the soldierly profession would reveal itself in powerful ways in 
several of his writings, particularly in War and Peace. We see this, for example, in his treatment 
of greatness as a concept indicative of worldly success and military conquest in the novel. To 
most readers, it is obvious that Tolstoy criticizes greatness or heroism as a myth used to 
romanticize Bonaparte and to justify the outcomes of war: 
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When it is impossible to stretch the elastic thread of historical argument further, when an 
action is plainly opposed to what all humanity is agreed in calling right and justice, the 
historians take refuge in the conception of greatness. Greatness would appear to exclude 
all possibility of applying standards of right and wrong. For the great man – nothing is 
wrong. There is no atrocity which could be made a ground for blaming a great man...And 
it never enters any one’s head that to admit a greatness, immeasurable by the rule of right 
and wrong, is but to accept one’s own nothingness and immeasurable littleness. (Tolstoy 
974) 
Demonstrably, Tolstoy believes that it is greatly mistaken for historians to use the concept of 
greatness to rationalize the events of war, arguing that one’s substantiation of greatness is 
compounded by the fact that, in order to establish this view, they must overlook any sense of 
right and wrong. However, Tolstoy does not altogether deny that greatness can exist within 
contexts of war. At one point in War and Peace, Tolstoy calls the character General Kutuzov “a 
truly great figure,” with an “extraordinary intuition into the significance of contemporary 
events,” rooted in “the purity and fervour of patriotic feeling in his heart” (Tolstoy 990).  
Moreover, as established, an overarching argument in War and Peace is concerned with the 
powerlessness of the human will within great historical events, such as war; Tolstoy argues that 
the subject of history is not, as many believe it to be, “the will of man” but rather the 
“representation of its action” (Tolstoy 1100); in other words, every act performed by soldiers are 
not their own but “related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity” (Tolstoy 
556). Yet, in exploring the question of the utility of soldiers, Tolstoy contends that “[t]he spirit of 
the army is the factor which multiplied by the mass gives the product of the force” (942): 
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The strategic principle, that armies should act in masses on the offensive, and should break 
up into smaller groups for retreat, unconsciously confirms the truth that the force of an army 
depends on its spirit. (Tolstoy 942) 
Tolstoy’s belief that soldiers’ morale can decisively change the course of war is further 
expressed in a passage in the novel between Andrey and another soldier, wherein Andrey 
passionately discounts all factors of an army that are commonly thought to be salient to the 
outcome of war – with the exception of human feeling: 
‘...Success never has depended and never will depend on position, on arms, nor even on 
numbers; and least of all, on position.’  
‘On what then?’  
‘On the feeling that is in me and him,’ he indicated Timohin, ‘and every soldier.’ 
(Tolstoy 709) 
Although Tolstoy rejects the notion that humans can exercise their own will in war, he does not 
reject the powerful role that the spiritedness of the army as a whole can play in affecting the 
outcome of war. The careful reader may wonder why Tolstoy even bothers to discuss the 
significance of the spirit of an army in a novel concerned with soldiers’ vain and irrational 
tendency to adulate or actualize ‘heroic’ acts. An answer potentially lies in his admiration for the 
military profession. 
The above passages from War and Peace illustrate that, while Tolstoy rejects both that a 
man’s greatness can be used to explain or justify the events of war and the presence of men’s 
will in war, he nonetheless believes that men can be great, and that they can powerfully influence 
whether or not victory is realized in war. In both his portrayal of General Kutuzov and of the 
Russian army as a whole, Tolstoy underscores a positive attribute of the army and consequently 
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demonstrates that – when considering certain facets of war within the fictional world that he 
creates – his writing is potentially guided by his implicit admiration for the soldierly profession.   
Of course, not all of the soldiers that Tolstoy creates and places in his novels are of a 
commendable character. For example, Petritsky in Anna Karenina is a young lieutenant who is 
“of no especially high nobility, not only not rich but in debt all around, always drunk towards 
evening, and often ending up in the guard house for various funny and dirty episodes” (Tolstoy 
112). But, I do not argue that Tolstoy’s esteem for the martial profession means that he is 
convinced that all those who become soldiers undergo a moral and/or intellectual transformation. 
Rather, I simply argue that he believes that the soldierly occupation offers a respectable choice 
whereby a man can attain a state of virtue, in the Rousseauian sense that I use the term ‘virtue’ in 
this paper. That choice thus represents a route that anticipates rather than causes the edification 
of characters when they immerse themselves in war.  
How does Rousseau define ‘virtue’? As established in the Introduction of this paper, 
Rousseau’s virtues matched those of old-fashioned pagans, or individuals who didn’t worship 
dominant religions in the world. These virtues include productivity and civic engagement, as 
well as patriotism and courage. These latter two characteristics, coupled with the manner in 
which Rousseau legitimizes warfare, likely explains why Rousseau paints an environment which 
cultivates virtue as analogous in nature to that of a regiment of soldiers. This environment is 
summarized in Wootton’s Introduction to a text that includes both Rousseau’s On the Social 
Contact and “The State of War”: 
Large, anonymous, unequal societies will foster vice, not virtue, because they will 
encourage competition, not a sense of solidarity. Rousseau thus offers a sociology of 
virtue. He also presents us with a profoundly uncomfortable conclusion: to achieve what 
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we are truly capable of as human beings, we need to live in a society characterized by 
proximity, equality, and similarity; if we do not live in such a society then we will always 
be at odds with ourselves. (Wootton, xxii) 
 As a political philosopher, Rousseau was interested in constructing an environment where 
human beings could not only meet their full potential, but also lead virtuous lives. As Wootton 
summarizes in the above paragraph, for Rousseau, such a community is structured in On the 
Social Contract and consists of several characteristics, like those of proximity and equality. First, 
in terms of proximity, Rousseau envisions “a very small state” where citizens can easily “gather 
together and…easily know all the others” (199). Second, a community of equality is 
distinguished by uniformity “in ranks and fortunes, without which equality in rights and 
authority cannot subsist for long” (199). According to Wootton, the last feature of this ideal 
environment is similarity, meaning that all citizens dwell in conditions that are analogous in their 
minimalism; to illustrate this point, he references Rousseau’s position that everyone should strive 
to live off of basic essentials as effectively as they can, or lead identical lives of “little or no 
luxury,” for added belongings or goods function as an obstacle “to the proliferation of public 
business and thorny discussions” (199). Although Wootton identifies this facet of Rousseau’s 
model society as an example of similarity, it also embodies Rousseau’s notion of simplicity, 
particularly because Rousseau specifically labels it as “a great simplicity of mores” (199).  
Approximately one-third of War and Peace takes place during times of war, specifically 
the Napoleonic Wars of 1803 to 1815 (Briggs 43). Among these many scenes of war, one in 
particular exemplifies Rousseau’s virtuous society, wherein morality is encouraged and 
reinforced through the instilment of qualities of proximity, equality, and similarity in the 
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environment. The below passage captures the atmosphere of the Napoleonic Wars that exists 
separate of the battlefield: 
Here in the regiment everything was clear and simple. The whole world was divided into 
two unequal parts: one our Pavlograd regiment, and the other – all the remainder. And 
with all that great remainder one had no concern. In the regiment everything was well 
known: this man was a lieutenant, that one a captain; this was a good fellow and that one 
was not; but most of all, every one was a comrade...and when occasion came, to do what 
was clear and distinct, defined and commanded; and all would be well. (Tolstoy 359) 
The above passage describes the regiment of soldier Nikolay Rostov and parallels Rousseau’s 
vision of an ideal society, one “that could not subsist without virtue” (199). Tolstoy’s 
environment is simple, not just because everything in the division is depicted as being “clear and 
simple,” but also because it lacks the complexity affiliated with the luxurious lifestyle he led 
within the realm of society; as detailed immediately prior to the start of the passage in the novel, 
here in the regiment, a regiment characterized by minimalist conditions and straightforward 
duties, “was none of all that confusion of the free world” where Rostov “did not know his proper 
place, and made mistakes in exercising free choice” (Tolstoy 359). Moreover, although the 
rankings of “lieutenant” and “captain” prevents men from being equivalent in terms of status, 
Tolstoy states that, “most of all, every one was a comrade,” equalizing the soldiers in character 
and in brotherhood. Finally, the environment is overtly characterized by its proximity; while the 
reader can assume that regiments entail confined conditions, Tolstoy emphasizes the restricted 
space of the area by dividing it from “the remainder” of the whole world, labeling the war and 
everything that exists outside of it as “two unequal parts.” It’s easy for the reader to deduce to 
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what scale they are unequal – to what small degree the size of this regiment stands in comparison 
to the size of the rest of the entire world.  
Tolstoy’s description of the environment of a troop of soldiers between battles imitates 
Rousseau’s vision of a virtuous society, and thus connects an environment of war to an 
atmosphere that nurtures the virtues that Rousseau believed should be adopted by all of 
humankind. Accordingly, it makes complete sense that, in this scene, Tolstoy accentuates the 
desire to improve, or the desire for virtue, felt by Nikolay Rostov. For example, Tolstoy details 
how the regimental life provides Rostov with “a sense of pleasure and relief” specifically 
because it serves as a place of atonement for him: 
…he had resolved not to serve as before, but to atone for his fault by good conduct, and 
by being a thoroughly good soldier and officer, that is a good man, a task so difficult in 
the world, but so possible in the regiment. (Tolstoy 359) 
The “fault” to which Rostov is referring is that of his formidable gambling debts, which have 
compounded his family’s financial difficulties. While he is atoning for this calamity by 
requesting his parents send him eight thousand roubles less a year than per usual, he is also 
expressing his repentance by attempting to improve his character – by striving to become not 
only a better soldier and officer, but also a better man. Indeed, Rostov desires to enhance his own 
goodness, and, in alignment with Rousseau’s philosophy, feels certain that this can only be 
achieved within an atmosphere of unquestionable virtue, within the military. 
Moreover, Rostov declares his regiment to be “a home as unchangeably dear and 
precious as [his] parental home”; although he at first felt “himself deprived of liberty and nailed 
down within one narrow, unchangeable framework” he is eventually overcome with “a feeling of 
peace and of moral support” in this paradoxically violent environment (Tolstoy 359). In other 
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words, Rostov feels both morally heightened and freer in an atmosphere in which his freedom is 
ironically limited. Intriguingly, Nikolay’s internal peace mirrors the disposition of Tolstoy when 
he donned his cadet’s uniform for the first time, as “he felt curiously happy ‘not to be free 
anymore’” (Troyat 90).  
I have argued that, although Tolstoy viewed war with ambivalence throughout his life, 
his writings convey an implicit appreciation of the soldierly profession. This appreciation likely 
elucidates why the author valorizes not war itself but the individuals and relationships within it, 
and accordingly paints a regimental environment that is situated within the atmosphere of the 
Napoleonic Wars to parallel the virtuous environment envisioned by Rousseau in his Social 
Contract. It also elucidates why, in both War and Peace and Anna Karenina, war is a key 
element of soldiers’ edification. 
 
Analysis of Edification 
 Both Prince Andrey Bolkonsky and Count Pierre Bezukhov experience edification within 
the pages of War and Peace. In both instances, the actions of the characters in war yield their 
improved states; yet it is their internalized thoughts or, in the particular case of Pierre, both their 
thoughts and verbalized speech that demonstrate their moral and intellectual transformations. 
Unlike Andrey and Pierre, Alexei Vronsky does not experience edification in Anna 
Karenina. Although action and language have been recognized as integral components of 
edification, to argue that Vronsky fails to experience edification is clearly not to say that he was 
a mute, or physically disabled. However, in foregoing his duties as a soldier, Vronsky does 
become metaphorically paralyzed; as F.S. Leavin argues, after leaving the army, Vronsky is 
deprived of “a purpose, a sense of function, a place in life, a meaning” (23). By the novel’s end, 
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his figurative paralysis, and thus his unedified state, is further demonstrated by the fact that he 
feels only one route in life is left for him to take: that of death, which will be secured by his re-
immersion into the war effort.  
 
War and Peace: The Edification of Prince Andrey Bolkonsky 
I. Background 
Andrey flees to war in order to escape the weariness of his life in Moscow. One scene 
illustrating this weariness suggests that Andrey would enjoy an environment shrouded in 
violence – that is, an environment comprised of action and conflict rather than idleness and 
superficiality. Andrey “sat lolling” in the drawing-room of Anna Pavlovna “with half-closed 
eyelids” before beginning to speak to Pierre of both his unhappy marriage and the success of his 
hero, conqueror Napoleon Bonaparte, a conversation which stirred a change in his physiognomy 
(Tolstoy 24): 
His dry face was quivering with nervous excitement in every muscle; his eyes, which had 
seemed lusterless and lifeless, now gleamed with a full, vivid light. It seemed that the 
more lifeless he was at ordinary times, the more energetic he became at such moments of 
morbid irritability. (Tolstoy 24)  
Andrey yearns for “moments of morbid irritability” in a life that fails too often to deliver them, 
motivating him to pursue a life that is defined by them alone. It follows that, once Andrey 
departs Russia to join his regiment, “his former affectation, ennui, and indolence” evaporate 
from his being, no longer present in “the expression of his face, in his gestures, [or] in his gait” 
(Tolstoy 110): 
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He had the air of a man who has not time to think of the impression he is making on 
others, and is absorbed in work, both agreeable and interesting. His face showed more 
satisfaction with himself and those around him. His smile and his glance were more light-
hearted and attractive. (Tolstoy 110) 
While immersed in Russian society, everything Andrey does is tinged with his dissatisfaction 
with his own idleness. Yet, when Andrey is caught up in the activities of war, Tolstoy 
characterizes him as “one of those rare staff-officers whose interests are concentrated on the 
general progress of the war,” and who envisions victorious outcomes that produce in him rushes 
“of joyful emotion” (111). In general, the promise of impending violence and glory consumes 
Andrey with happiness; in closing his eyes and hearing “the firing of guns and 
cannons…echoing in his ears” he concurrently feels “the sensation of victory” (Tolstoy 134). 
Although the reader may at this point think that Andrey’s newfound sense of self-satisfaction 
conveys his edified state, Tolstoy informs the reader that the contentment he experiences, though 
immense, is only “the first instalment of some coveted happiness,” (134). Moreover, while at war 
Andrey has become more productive, he has yet to become knowledgeable of his own purpose, 
or the purpose of humankind (Tolstoy 134). In fact, what prevents Andrey from ascertaining this 
purpose is his obsession with heroism, particularly his ardent longing to become a hero. 
 A striking component of Tolstoy’s novel is his rejection of heroism and the adulation of 
heroes. He asserts the error of historians who idealize heroism as a factor in Russia’s victory in 
the Napoleonic Wars, and condemns any man who aspires to be a hero in war as “useless” 
(Tolstoy 858): 
Those who were striving to grasp the general course of events, and trying by self-
sacrifice and heroism to take a hand in it, were the most useless members in society; they 
89 
saw everything upside down, and all that they did with the best intentions turned out to be 
useless folly… (Tolstoy 858) 
Andrey is part of this typology of uselessness. As a soldier, he desires to be the savior of the 
Russian army, and is titillated by the idea that he could be “the very man destined to extricate the 
Russian army” from their “hopeless position” (Tolstoy 145). He believes this achievement would 
lift him “for ever out of the ranks of unknown officers” and would finally carry him towards “the 
first path to glory” (Tolstoy 145). Indeed, in first entering the war Andrey cares for little more 
than attaining this glory and becoming immortalized: 
…but if I want that, if I want glory, want to be known to men, want to be loved by them, 
it’s not my fault that I want it, that it’s the only thing I care for, the only thing I live for. 
Yes, the only thing! I shall never say to any one, but, my God! what am I to do, if I care 
for nothing but glory, but men’s love? (Tolstoy 238) 
Andrey recognizes the irrationality of his longing to be glorified, but does not believe that his 
fixation on heroism can be ameliorated. He continues to admit to himself that he craves glory 
more than he fears death or loss, and more than he values the life of his father, sister, or wife 
(Tolstoy 238).  
II. Initial Edification 
However, after becoming severely wounded, Andrey finally perceives the triviality of 
these aspirations, and, moreover, the triviality of his own existence. Struck by a hard blow to the 
head in the midst of combat, he is knocked to the ground of the battlefield. Instead of 
succumbing to fear or losing consciousness, however, Andrey studies the grey clouds traveling 
across the sky, and proclaims that “all is vanity, all is a cheat” except the infinite sky which 
stares back at him (Tolstoy 253). After the battle has concluded, he realizes that Napoleon 
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Bonaparte – his venerated hero – is standing before him, examining his body and believing him 
to be dead (Tolstoy 262). Yet, Andrey does not feel overcome with the same reverence he had 
felt for Bonaparte at earlier moments in the novel. Instead, he remains captivated by the “high, 
far-away, everlasting sky” before him (Tolstoy 263): 
He knew it was Napoleon – his hero – but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such 
a small, insignificant creature in comparison with what was passing now between his soul 
and that lofty, limitless sky with the clouds flying over it. It meant nothing to him at that 
moment who was standing over him, what was being said of him. He was only glad that 
people were standing over him, and his only desire was that these people should help him 
and bring him back to life, which seemed to him so good, because he saw it all quite 
differently now. (Tolstoy 262-263) 
This epiphany epitomizes the initial edification of Andrey, wherein he is endowed with a greater 
sense of self-fulfillment and with a clearer comprehension of his own purpose as well as the 
purpose of humankind. As he lies there on the ground, bleeding profusely, he is not only 
consumed with a fresh appreciation for life, which suddenly “seemed to him so good”; he also 
gains a clear understanding of the shared insignificance of all humans, of which Napoleon 
Bonaparte is no exception. Simultaneously, he perceives the incalculable value of life, and 
desires in a way he never had before to remain a part of it. Additionally, he becomes intensely 
aware of our inability to understand everything, and especially our inability to understand that 
which cannot be understood, like the otherworldly, the ethereal. As Andrey pronounces, “[t]here 
is nothing, nothing certain but the nothingness of all that is comprehensible to us, and the 
grandeur of something incomprehensible, but more important!” (Tolstoy 264).  
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Fortunately, Andrey survives his injury, and successfully returns home to Moscow to 
reunite with his family, most of whom had supposed him to be dead due to his protracted 
absence and the lack of knowledge of his whereabouts. Arriving home, Andrey exemplifies his 
edified state, addressing his wife with patience and compassion for the first time in the novel, 
and sharing with her his nascent understanding of the mercy of the Lord: “‘My precious,’” he 
states, describing her with an epithet “he had never used speaking to her before…‘God is 
merciful’” (Tolstoy 295). Yet, in an ironic twist, Andrey returns from death just as his wife 
descends to it, and as his son is bestowed with the gift of life. That is to say, Andrey arrives 
home as his wife dies in childbirth.  
 Although Andrey has already experienced a full and tumultuous life by this point in the 
novel, his narrative has hardly begun. Following the Austerlitz campaign and his near death, 
Andrey “grimly” resolves to never again serve in the army, instead taking “service under his 
father in the levying of the militia, so as to escape active service” (Tolstoy 336). All the while, 
Andrey cannot help but regret his inaction, and in fact becomes angry at the realization “that the 
far-away life out there – in which he had no part – could trouble him” (Tolstoy 341). Even his 
sister Marie recognizes her brother’s incompatibility with a life independent of the army, 
informing Pierre that he “needs activity,” for “this quiet, regular life is bad for him” (Tolstoy 
357). 
III. Re-edification 
 It isn’t long before Andrey re-enlists in the war effort, most overtly due to his re-emerged 
apathy for societal life; while he is traveling abroad on behalf of his father’s wishes, his beloved 
fiancée, Natasha Rostov, breaks off their engagement after she is manipulated and seduced by 
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Anatole Kuragin, a corrupt and deceptive hedonist who is secretly married to another woman. 
With Natasha’s betrayal, Andrey loses all of his positive interest and engagement in life: 
Now he dreaded indeed those ideas that had then opened to him boundless vistas of light. 
Now he was occupied only with the most practical interests lying close at hand, and in no 
way associated with those old ideals…It was as though the infinite, fathomless arch of 
heaven that had once stood over him had been suddenly transformed into a low, limited 
vault weighing upon him, with everything in it clear, but nothing eternal and mysterious. 
(Tolstoy 574-575) 
Indeed, the spiritual well-being that had suffused Andrey’s being, and had opened his mind and 
heart to the grandness of and joy inherent in life, collapses within him with the collapse of his 
blissful engagement to Natasha.    
Still, it’s important to recognize that Andrey doesn’t rejoin the army only because of his 
contempt for all other facets of Russian life; he also receives an indispensable amount of relief 
and comfort as a soldier. As noted several times in the novel, of all the pursuits that Andrey 
chases throughout his life, “military service was the simplest and most familiar to him” (Tolstoy 
575). Acting as if he had never known a reality aside from that of the regiment, he performs his 
duties as a general on Kutuzov’s staff “with zeal and perseverance,” actually surprising Kutuzov 
by his ardent “eagerness for work and conscientiousness” (Tolstoy 575). In fact, Andrey 
becomes so re-immersed in his martial duties that he abandons his senseless pursuit of Anatole 
Kuragin, suddenly deciding that it was unnecessary for him “to gallop back to Russia in search 
of him” (Tolstoy 575); “being at the centre of the immense war” effectively functions to relieve 
Andrey from “the idea of Kuragin” (Tolstoy 579). This incident demonstrates the virtue 
interwoven in the responsibilities of a soldier, for Andrey’s involvement with his responsibilities 
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in the battalion dissuades him from pursuing a senseless and potentially fatal action. This 
incident additionally foresees the ephemerality of (or the approaching end to) his demoralized 
state of being. 
Indeed, Andrey’s transformed demeanor in the war largely anticipates a second and more 
profound moral and spiritual enlightenment. Not long into his re-entry in the service, Andrey 
becomes severely injured again, his body mutilated by the detonation of a grenade that lands 
only a few paces away from him (Tolstoy 742). Wounded, this time fatally, Andrey becomes re-
acquainted with the boundless love and fresh understanding of life that had previously struck 
him. But this time, his comprehension of life has become so clear that he no longer fears leaving 
it. That is to say, the first time Andrey was gravely injured in battle, he experienced an 
unprecedented contentment and serenity, but did not experience these emotions to their fullness. 
He still felt troubled by the unknown, the “inconceivable…to which [he] could not appeal,” with 
the God whose picture rested in a locket his sister had given to him: 
‘How happy and at peace I should be, if I could say now, ‘Lord, have mercy on me!...’ 
But to whom am I to say that? Either a Power infinite, inconceivable, to which I cannot 
appeal, which I cannot even put into words, the great whole or nothing…or that God, 
who has been sewn up here in this locket by Marie?’ (Tolstoy 264) 
Now wounded once more and carried into a tent to be treated, Andrey is fortuitously placed 
beside a dying man whom he had desired to kill: Anatole Kuragin. But instead of feeling 
emotions of satisfaction and pride in witnessing Anatole’s pain and mutilation, Andrey instead 
feels “a passionate pity and love” for the suffering Anatole, and feels his heart burst with 
happiness to sympathize with and forgive a man he had branded as his enemy (Tolstoy 745): 
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Prince Andrey wept tears of love and tenderness over his fellow-men, over himself, and 
over their errors and his own. ‘Sympathy, love for our brothers…love for our enemies; 
yes, the love that God preached upon earth, that Marie sought to teach me, and I did not 
understand, that is why I am sorry to part with life, that is what was left me if I had lived. 
But now it is too late. I know that!’ (Tolstoy 745) 
Only now does Andrey fully understand the human purpose, and the import of his sister’s 
teachings: people exist to love universally, and especially to love those who are most difficult to 
love. He thus is struck with an even more consummate happiness than before, a “new 
happiness…[that] had something to do with the Gospel” (Tolstoy 838). And this happiness is 
rooted in his gratitude for life and simultaneous fearlessness to part from it: 
‘But isn’t it all the same now?...What will be there, and what has been here? why was I so 
sorry to part with life?” (Tolstoy 743)  
Moreover, in his previous edification Andrey had merely grasped the triviality of human 
aspirations and desires, and thus the mutual insignificance of heroes and the attainment of glory. 
Yet now Andrey is also awakened to the absence of human volition in both love and warfare, for 
he is entirely unable to repress a divine sort of love for his enemy, a love that he feels is “the 
very essence of the soul” (Tolstoy 839). He learns that the faculties of the soul can act separate 
from man’s will, yet can be recognized and embraced by the mind, elucidating why he is unable 
to suppress the divine love that he feels not only for Anatole but for Natasha as well (Tolstoy 
838). Indeed, Natasha, who had pledged her love to him and then betrayed him, now becomes 
one “whom of all the people in the world he most longed to love” with this “new, pure, divine 
love that had been revealed to him” (Tolstoy 840).  
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Andrey does not survive the length of the novel. Yet, under the masterful hand of 
Tolstoy, the death of the character delivers an experience for the reader that is unprecedented in 
both its authenticity and ethereality. For, in capturing Andrey’s dying state, Tolstoy amalgamates 
the physical with the spiritual, and somehow shines clarity on an unfathomable mystery. That is 
to say, while Andrey approaches his death, his body and his mind are somehow simultaneously 
rooted both in life and in the afterlife. His soul is “not in its normal state,” suspended in a liminal 
and paradoxical space between lucidity and powerlessness, as its faculties “were clearer and 
more active than ever” yet “acted apart from his will” (Tolstoy 838). He contemplates the 
divinity and the divine happiness to which he has been awakened: 
Happiness beyond the reach of material, external influences on man, the happiness of the 
soul alone, the happiness of love! To feel it is in every man’s power, but God alone can 
know it and ordain it. But how did God ordain this law? Why the Son?... (Tolstoy 839) 
Although Andrey’s mind has been partially enveloped by the unearthly, it still ventures back to 
the ordinary reality where he still exists, a reality symbolized by a fly buzzing around the room 
in which he lies. Indeed, his celestial-like train of thought is intermittently broken off by the soft 
“‘Piti-pitt-piti…ipiti-piti” of a flap of wings “incessantly beating time,” counting down the 
limited moments of Andrey’s life and, more generally, of life itself (Tolstoy 839). Indeed, 
Tolstoy creates a different reality for both Andrey and the reader that is uncanny in emulating the 
life we know and the life that we do not.  
The reader feels secure in not only seeing that the death of Andrey is beautifully and 
carefully rendered, but also in seeing that he does not die in the heartbreak and apathy he had 
known most recently. He dies in an unprecedented state of happiness, with an unbounded 
knowledge of the value of both life and the afterlife. He dies an edified man. 
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War and Peace: The Edification of Count Pierre Bezukhov  
I. Background 
In describing the state of war, Rousseau briefly considers that men can become “irritated” 
and “could sometimes kill another, either openly or by surprise,” or in open, witness-laden areas 
or covertly (258). That is to say, he acknowledges that man can act violently for reasons separate 
from their inclination to preserve themselves; for example, one man can challenge another man 
to a duel. Yet, as previously established, Rousseau does not view such an “illegitimate” and 
“barbarous” act as exemplary of “a genuine state of war” (259). Rousseau’s criticism of dueling 
likely explains in part why Tolstoy designs the duel between Pierre and Dolohov as a direct 
result of societal gossip and Pierre’s short temper rather than something of greater consequence. 
It also explains why, unlike the war’s effect on Andrey, this element of violence in the novel 
does not produce Pierre’s edified state. 
 However, Pierre does eventually enlist in the war effort after witnessing the appalling 
treatment of French individuals by Russian citizens. Although Pierre initially cites the war’s 
incongruity with his own principles as his reasoning for not enrolling, prior to joining the war 
effort he credits “his vow to the Masonic brotherhood, which preached universal peace and the 
abolition of war,” and the deep shame he felt in comparing himself to “the great mass of Moscow 
gentlemen, who put on uniforms, and professed themselves patriots” as what initially deters him 
from becoming a soldier (Tolstoy 610). Regarding the latter point, it is Pierre’s perception of his 
own lowliness and debasement that distances him from the war and thus suggests that he is of a 
character ripe for edification, or some kind of transformation or improvement in spirit. Indeed, 
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Pierre is not only incapable of imagining himself as a soldier; he evidently prefers to 
subconsciously reduce himself to the value of a demonic beast: 
A cause that weighed with him even more in not entering the army was the obscure 
conception that he, l’russe Besuhof, had somehow the mystic value of the number of the 
beast, 666, that his share in putting a limit to the power of the beast, ‘speaking great 
things and blasphemies,’ had been ordained from all eternity, and that therefore it was not 
for him to take any step whatever; it was for him to wait for what was bound to come to 
pass. (Tolstoy 611) 
The above passage mirrors a theme central to this novel: a person is an imperfect and limited 
creature, and thus their ability to control their own fate, and especially to control the fate of 
something as formidable as war, is minimal. Pierre recognizes his own limits, and in this 
recognition he feels certain that it would be foolish of him to take action himself rather than to 
just wait till the path to which life would inevitably guide him is revealed. Although the reader 
may dismiss this passage as another example of Pierre’s consistent acknowledgement of his own 
depravity, it actually functions to foreshadow Pierre’s eventual enlistment in the war. For, if 
Pierre truly believes in the absence of volition in his own life, that his life and capabilities “had 
been ordained from all eternity,” it makes sense that he would find himself in an environment – 
namely, a war zone – that epitomizes historical inevitability in its relation to the relative absence 
of power that essentially defines human beings. The Napoleonic Wars, as Tolstoy states, had no 
definitive cause, but “was bound to happen, simply because it was bound to happen”; when 
caught up in a war, a man consciously “lives on his own account in freedom of will,” but at the 
same time, paradoxically, “as an unconscious instrument in bringing about the historical ends of 
humanity” (Tolstoy 554-555). 
98 
 In finally enlisting in a regiment, Pierre’s feelings strongly mirror those of Andrey when 
he had abandoned Russian society to become a soldier; he experiences a great level of self-
satisfaction within his new surroundings, and is struck with a new purpose as ambitious and as 
absurd as Andrey’s preoccupation with attaining glory: to kill Napoleon Bonaparte. Addressing 
the former point, Pierre is impressed with the spiritedness of his comrades, whose elation 
“became more and more marked” with every cannon ball that falls in their sight (Tolstoy 728). 
He notices how the faces of his fellow soldiers brighten and gleam “like lightning flashes” with 
the latent fire flying around them, and becomes “entirely engrossed in the contemplation of that 
growing fire,” a fire which he “felt…burning in his own soul too” (Tolstoy 728). Addressing the 
latter point, although Pierre still feels an “overwhelming sense of his own pettiness and falsity” 
in comparing himself “with the truth and simplicity and force of that class of men,” he remains in 
the war predominantly because he is driven to kill a man he had once deemed his hero: Napoleon 
Bonaparte (Tolstoy 820). That is to say, in entering the war, Pierre’s cabalistic view of himself as 
the humanization of “the Beast” evolves; he now affiliates this Beast with Bonaparte, and feels 
that it is “necessary and inevitable,” that he is in fact destined to rid the world of this creature by 
killing Napoleon (Tolstoy 821). 
 Yet, Pierre is too firmly enthralled by Rousseau’s notion of human beings as “naturally 
peaceable and timid,” and hence “not allowed to sacrifice the life of his fellowman except to 
preserve his own, and there it makes him feel horror at spilling human blood” (258). Indeed, 
when Pierre becomes aware that he may encounter Napoleon on the battlefield, he swiftly 
realizes that he cannot kill Napoleon because he lacks the capacity to kill another man: 
Pierre felt it as praiseworthy and as beneficial as ever to slay the miscreant; but he felt 
now that he would not do it. He struggled against the consciousness of his own weakness, 
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but he vaguely felt that he could not overcome it, that his past gloomy train of ideas, of 
vengeance, murder, and self-sacrifice, had been blown away like dust at contact with the 
first human being. (Tolstoy 828) 
Unable to deny to himself that his conscience prohibits him from taking Napoleon’s life, Pierre 
no longer aspires to kill Napoleon, but only to somehow falsely “prove to himself that he was not 
renouncing his design, but was doing everything to carry it out” (Tolstoy 842). Indeed, like 
Andrey, Pierre does not acquire edification or new enlightenment as a result of striving to be a 
glorious and all-conquering soldier, although he had desperately wanted to become one. Instead, 
he becomes spiritually cleansed only after undergoing a period of great suffering, wherein he is 
taken prisoner by the French. 
II. Edification 
 As a prisoner of war, Pierre meets a common but exceptionally wise former soldier 
named Platon Karataev, who becomes ingrained in his memory as “the personification of 
everything Russian, kindly, and round” (Tolstoy 884). Karataev is a man who apparently speaks 
without premeditated thought, and who, like the philosopher Plato, asks others questions in an 
effort to bring “out clearly the moral beauty of the action of which he was told” (Tolstoy 885-
886). Only through his influence, his teaching by example rather than his formal, didactic 
instruction, does Pierre unearth the purpose of his own life and of human life in general:  
And it was just at this time that he attained that peace and content with himself, for which 
he had always striven in vain before...He had sought for it in philanthropy, in 
freemasonry, in the dissipations of society, in wine, in heroic feats of self-sacrifice, in his 
romantic love for Natasha; he had sought it by the path of thought; and all his researches 
and all his efforts had failed him. And now without any thoughts of his own, he had 
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gained that peace and that harmony with himself simply through the horror of death, 
through hardships, through what he had seen in Karataev. (Tolstoy 922)  
Indeed, Pierre finds self-fulfillment largely through his friendship with Karataev. Moreover, 
Pierre becomes intellectually enlightened in that he discovers the import of life: to be happy, 
particularly to find happiness in the simplicity of life, in accepting things as they are rather than 
how they might be. He ascertains how futile it is to deliberately search for happiness, discerning 
this search as an innate struggle that was “only given us for our torment” (922). Now, in 
captivity, he distinguishes “the highest and most certain happiness of man” as nothing more than 
the “absence of suffering, the satisfaction of needs” as well as “freedom in the choice of 
occupation” (Tolstoy 922). He learns that humans exist and are created “for happiness,” and 
“that happiness lies in himself, in the satisfaction of his natural, human cravings”; the world does 
not contain anything “terrible to be dreaded,” and every man is capable of being happy (Tolstoy 
965).  
Yet, Karataev’s companionship is not what alone transforms Pierre; his moral and 
intellectual enlightenment is also produced by his firsthand experience of the violence innate to 
war. As a prisoner of war, Pierre witnesses the execution of a number of other prisoners, an 
occurrence that initially ruptures “the spring in his soul,” and causes his life to collapse “into a 
heap of meaningless refuse” (Tolstoy 881). Paralleling Andrey’s state of mind after he had lost 
Natasha, Pierre feels his faith in the universe and its ordering, as well as his faith “in the soul of 
men, and in his own soul, and in God” disintegrate within him, as he is overcome by a new sense 
of hopelessness that he “had experienced before, but never with such intensity as now” (Tolstoy 
881). But, after surviving a month as a prisoner of war, Pierre begins to view this traumatic 
experience with new eyes: 
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Those fearful moments that he had lived through during the execution had, as it were, 
washed for ever from his imagination and his memory the disturbing ideas and feelings 
that had one seemed to him so important. No thought came to him of the war, of politics, 
or of Napoleon. (Tolstoy 922) 
Only after witnessing the executions does Pierre comprehend the senselessness of fretting over 
subjects that so obviously “did not concern him,” and did not require his judgment (Tolstoy 922). 
He now sees his wish to kill Napoleon as “ludicrous,” and realizes that the anger he harbors for 
his estranged wife, and the fear he retains of her disgracing his name, were “trivial” and 
“amusing” feelings (Tolstoy 922). In drawing a clear connection between the most violent 
episode Pierre experiences and his morally and intellectually transformed state, Tolstoy reifies 
the role of violence as an element in his characters’ edification. 
The edification of Pierre is indisputable; he becomes intellectually enlightened in 
unearthing the secret of happiness and pure self-contentment, and morally enlightened in that he 
attains this happiness himself, and it remains with him for the remainder of the novel. Indeed, for 
the rest of his life Pierre often recalls his month as a prisoner of war, and only “with enthusiasm 
in his voice,” would speak of “those intense and joyful sensations” and “that full, spiritual peace, 
of that perfect, inward freedom, of which he had only experience at that period” (Tolstoy 923). 
Demonstrably, Pierre fully recognizes how he has profited from his epoch of suffering. 
Reuniting with Natasha, his future wife, and Princess Marie, the sister of the now deceased 
Andrey, Pierre reveals to them the gratitude he feels for his past harrowing experiences, his eyes 
all the while shining with a newfound “satisfaction with life” (Tolstoy 1016): 
‘They say: sufferings are misfortunes…But if at once, this minute, I was asked, would I 
remain what I was before I was taken prisoner, or go through it all again, I should say, for 
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God’s sake let me rather be a prisoner and eat horse-flesh again. We imagine that as soon 
as we are torn out of our habitual path all is over, but it is only the beginning of 
something new and good. As long as there is there is life, there is happiness.’ (Tolstoy 
1018) 
Although the reader sees that Andrey morally and spiritually transforms twice in the novel, both 
times after nearly dying on the battlefield, he never explicitly expresses his appreciation for the 
sufferings he endures in order to come out the other end of it an edified man. It is therefore open 
to interpretation whether or not Andrey attributes his edification to his past ordeals. But, in 
Andrey’s wake, Pierre explicitly states that he views his trauma as the gateway to his happiness 
and his edification; unlike Andrey, his edification is expressed not alone through his actions and 
unspoken thoughts, but through his actions, thoughts, and verbalized speech. He provides a voice 
for a perspective that Andrey could not articulate, and the reader can be forgiven for thinking 
that his position is representative of Andrey’s, especially because Pierre articulates it in his own 
house, to the two individuals who were of the greatest importance to him in his life, and, in 
eventually marrying Natasha, adopts a life similar to that which Andrey would have led had he 
survived – as will be further discussed in the ‘Counterparts’ chapter at the end of this section. 
 When Pierre returns to Princess Marie’s house the following day, he drives though streets 
located “between the charred wrecks of houses,” silently admiring “the beauty of those ruins” 
(Tolstoy 1021). Within them he pinpoints “cheerful, beaming faces” staring back at him, 
unaffected by the pillage surrounding them (Tolstoy 1021). Although this scene most overtly 
functions to illustrate Pierre’s renewed love for Natasha, and his excitement to once again see her 
on his visit to the house, it also symbolizes how easily and masterfully Pierre can now discern 
light within a dark landscape, warmth within an indifferent atmosphere, hope within a decimated 
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region. In War and Peace, Tolstoy identifies war as an event inherently “opposed to human 
reason and all human nature” (553). Yet, like Pierre, Tolstoy can decipher the good within an 
atmosphere shrouded in confusion and destruction, and he does just that in crafting a story that 
dismisses war as senseless and needlessly destructive to humankind and simultaneously as an 
element in the edification of the novel’s two male protagonists.  
 
Anna Karenina: The Non-Edification of Alexei Vronsky 
Sergei Ivanovich: ‘We have seen and still see how hundreds and hundreds of people, 
abandoning everything to serve a just cause, come from all ends of Russia and directly 
and clearly state their thought and aim. They bring their kopecks or go themselves and 
directly say why. What does that mean?’ 
Konstantin Levin: ‘In my opinion...it means that, among eighty million people, there are 
always to be found…tens of thousands of people who have lost their social position, 
reckless people, who are always ready – to join Pugachev’s band, to go to Khiva, to 
Serbia…’ 
Sergei Ivanovich: ‘I tell you, they are not hundreds and not reckless people, but the best 
representatives of the nation!’ (Tolstoy 807) 
The above dialogue captures the dialectic of Levin and his half-brother Sergei Ivanovich, two 
men who are opposed in both character and principles. In reading this scene, one may initially 
wonder whether Tolstoy more closely identifies with the position of Ivanovich or that of Levin. 
Many might argue in favor of Levin, particularly because, as Briggs suggests, the character 
serves as a “thinly veiled reincarnation of Tolstoy himself” (65); and, like Levin, Tolstoy also 
had an older brother (though full, not half) named Sergei with whom he had a close relationship 
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(Troyat 42). But, Sergei was a man who Tolstoy admired so much – particularly throughout his 
childhood – that in describing him he once wrote, “I copied him, I loved him, I wanted to be 
him” (Troyat 16). Moreover, as a child Tolstoy established a code of behavior to become more 
like him, although he ultimately came to be more of “a caricature of Serge[i]” (Troyat 43). 
Indeed, although Tolstoy may have been more intimately affiliated with the character Levin, this 
doesn’t necessarily restrict him from aligning himself with the perspective of Sergei.   
Still, Tolstoy’s intent in writing this passage may not have even been to express a 
personal position; perhaps he was merely trying to paint a comprehensive portrait of soldiers, 
one that is humanized by the soldier of greatest interest in Anna Karenina. Alexei Vronsky is a 
man who encompasses both the honorable commitment as well as the utter recklessness of 
soldiers, beginning the novel as an ambitious and determined aide-de-camp and leaving it as a 
non-committed, despondent combatant whose only interest in war is the death that it promises. 
 The character transformation at the center of Anna Karenina is that of its eponymous 
protagonist, who begins the novel as a universally venerated and envied woman in aristocratic 
Russian society and exits it as an adulterous harlot alienated from this society that once adored 
her. Yet, in the course of the novel, a number of other significant transformations occur, 
including that of Alexei Vronsky, Anna Karenina’s lover whose tireless pursuit of her results in 
her dissipated and despondent state. As established, Alexei Vronsky is raised to be a committed 
and diligent soldier who is both shaped and held in high esteem by his societal peers. Yet, at a 
turning point in the novel, Vronsky forsakes his service to travel abroad with Anna, and in doing 
so he assures the couple’s tragic end, wherein Anna commits suicide by throwing herself in front 
of a train and Vronsky re-enlists in the army essentially so he can die in war. Indeed, although 
the tragedy of Anna Karenina is the overt result of her illicit affair with Vronsky, Vronsky’s 
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abandonment of the army also signifies the immorality of the affair and foreshadows the 
characters’ devastating final moments in the novel. Accordingly, I argue that Tolstoy deliberately 
casts Vronsky as a soldier because his desertion of the war effort is meant to augment the 
immorality of his trajectory as a character.  
I. Vronsky’s Morality as a Soldier 
 From the time of his birth, Vronsky is fashioned to be a soldier respected and revered by 
all that cross paths with him. Vronsky is raised with militarism so deeply ingrained in him that, 
in the first stages of his turbulent romance with Anna – which fill “the whole of [his] inner life” 
with passion – he still manages to retain the equanimity of an external life composed of “social 
and regimental connections and interests” (Tolstoy 173). This is because “[r]egimental interests 
occupied an important place in Vronsky’s life,” which Vronsky accepts “because he loved his 
regiment” and especially “because he was loved in the regiment” (Tolstoy 173). Indeed, as he 
was molded to be a soldier, a man who had “never known family life,” Vronsky is initially 
incapable of imagining himself in a context in which he is not a bachelor and wholly 
autonomous, and thus leading a kind of life existing outside of the military realm (Tolstoy 56):  
Marriage had never presented itself as a possibility to him. He not only did not like 
family life, but pictured the family, and especially a husband, according to the general 
view of the bachelor world in which he lived, as something alien, hostile and above all, 
ridiculous. (Tolstoy 57)  
Vronsky does not desire or even understand human commitment, explaining why he cannot 
fathom the conventions of romance, or how to properly court a woman. For example, when 
pursuing Kitty Shcherbatsky in the beginning of the novel, “a sweet, innocent society girl” who 
falls in love with Vronsky, he unconsciously acts selfishly, not recognizing that he is committing 
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“one of the bad actions common among brilliant young men” of luring a young woman without 
the intention of marrying her (Tolstoy 57). Vronsky does not perceive his actions as morally 
repugnant; he would have been “very surprised” to learn that Kitty would be distraught if he 
failed to marry her, for his self-consumed nature conditions him to not believe that “something 
which gave such great and good pleasure to him, and above all to her, could be bad” (Tolstoy 
57). While he understands that “something had to be done” between himself and Kitty, he fails to 
perceive “what could and should be done” (Tolstoy 57). 
While the reader may be repulsed by the evident narcissism of Vronsky, further analysis 
persuades the reader to prefer the arrogant and ignorant soldier to the arrogant and ignorant 
paramour, largely because the former favors peace while the latter causes destruction. In a scene 
that takes place in the French Theatre, Vronsky is seeking to reconcile a dispute in which “the 
interests of the regiment were involved” (Tolstoy 131). A fight had broken out between two 
officers of his regiment, and the regimental commander recruits Vronsky to resolve it, believing 
him “to be a noble and intelligent man” as well as “a man who cherished the honour of the 
regiment” (Tolstoy 132). Notably, any success that Vronsky has in resolving the conflict is 
attained because of who he is rather than what he says: 
The regimental commander and Vronsky had both realized that Vronsky’s name and his 
imperial aide-de-camp’s monogram ought to contribute greatly to the mollifying of the 
titular councillor. And, indeed, these two means had proved partly effective… (Tolstoy 
132)  
Although Vronsky is not a particularly likeable character at any point of the novel, this scene 
exhibits his usefulness as a soldier; instead of causing destruction and ruin, as his abandonment 
of the regiment ultimately will, he is building peaceful relations between his comrades. In fact, in 
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this context Vronsky does not even perceive violence as a viable option that can be utilized in 
order to solve this particular dispute. In first becoming knowledgeable of the issue, Vronsky 
immediately distinguishes “all the unseemliness of the affair” and ascertains “that a duel was not 
possible”; instead, he understands that “everything must be done to mollify this titular councillor 
and hush the affair up” (Tolstoy 132).  
In direct juxtaposition to this, when Vronsky finds himself in his own dispute with 
another man, Alexei Alexandrovich, husband to Anna Karenina, he views dueling as the sole 
means through which to resolve the conflict. Indeed, after Anna has informed Vronsky that she 
has revealed their affair to her husband, the first thought that occurs to Vronsky is the 
inevitability of a duel, a thought that never occurs to either Anna or Alexandrovich (Tolstoy 
315). As he continues speaking with Anna about the matter, and holds a letter addressed to her 
from her husband that makes no mention of violence, he once again cannot escape the notion that 
a duel is inevitable: 
…Vronsky, while reading the letter, involuntarily yielded to the natural impression 
aroused in him by his attitude towards the insulted husband…he involuntarily pictured to 
himself the challenge he would probably find today or tomorrow at his place, and the 
duel itself, during which he would stand, with the same cold and proud expression that 
was now on his face, having fired into the air, awaiting the insulted husband’s shot. 
(Tolstoy 315) 
The irony apparent in comparing the disputes of the regimental soldiers with that between 
Vronsky and Alexandrovich cannot escape the reader. As a soldier, Vronsky fights to preserve 
goodwill and prevent the outbreak of unnecessary conflict; but as a man consumed with his own 
hedonism and hubris, a man who allows his martial ambitions to retreat “into the background” so 
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that he may bind himself to Anna “more and more strongly,” Vronsky is no longer concerned 
with maintaining peace (Tolstoy 356). He prefers to romanticize duels as chivalric events in 
which he can sacrifice his life to “the insulted husband” in an action that Rousseau characterizes 
as “barbarous” and “illegitimate” (258) and that Tolstoy himself – in nearly facing men in duels 
at two separate times in his youth – surely felt to be actions driven by pride and inflamed by 
haughtiness (Troyat 221-224). 
 Conclusively, the reader should not dismiss Vronsky’s role in the novel to be that of the 
self-indulgent, one-dimensional villain. Tolstoy is meticulous in showing the reader that Vronsky 
is a character of multiple layers, and numerous capabilities; he had served as a valuable asset to 
his regiment, and been effective in preventing the ruin or death of others. Only in losing his 
interest in the regiment and ultimately resigning from his commission does Vronsky confirm his 
role as an inciter of needless destruction and violence, embodied by the gory suicide of Anna 
Karenina. 
II. Pursuit of Anna Karenina as an Immoral Form of Warfare 
When beginning to pursue the affections of Anna Karenina, Vronsky addresses her as an 
inferior soldier would address his superior officer: “submissively,” “courteously,” and 
“respectfully” (Tolstoy 103). Vronsky’s obsequiousness to Anna further demonstrates his 
inability to shed his martial character in any context, how his military-oriented upbringing 
permeates every facet of his life. It is for this reason that Vronsky treats romance as a battle in 
itself, wherein the victory lies in the capture of Anna’s heart. Thus, when Vronsky loses interest 
in and then deserts his martial duties in order to pursue Anna Karenina, the reader should not 
interpret this action as a total escape from war. Merely, it is a descent into a more immoral and 
misguided form of warfare. 
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Even before meeting Anna Karenina and placing his pursuit of her above all other 
objectives, Vronsky interprets his romance with Kitty as a soldier might: as a fight between 
himself and another, wherein the victory of one must equate to the defeat of another. Although 
Vronsky had no intention of marrying Kitty himself, in learning that she declines Levin’s 
proposal of marriage due to her infatuation for himself, “[h]is chest involuntarily swelled and his 
eyes shone” for he “felt himself the victor” (Tolstoy 60). Indeed, Vronsky was more infatuated 
with the notion of winning the preference of Kitty than he was with Kitty herself, exemplifying 
his combative, soldierly spirit. 
After falling in love with Anna, Vronsky similarly cannot isolate the adversarial 
demeanor he exhibits as a soldier from that which he exhibits as a man in love. In speaking with 
her openly about his love for her, he asserts that from that moment onward they both could know 
no peace: 
 ‘Don’t you know that you are my whole life? But I know no peace and cannot give you 
any. All of myself, my love...yes. I cannot think of you and myself separately. You and I 
are one for me. And I do not see any possibility of peace ahead either for me or for you. I 
see the possibility of despair, of unhappiness...or I see the possibility of happiness, such 
happiness!...Isn’t is possible?’ (Tolstoy 139) 
Vronsky is not attempting to be theatrical in repeatedly arguing that he and Anna cannot know 
‘peace’. He genuinely views his pursuit of and resultant affair with Anna as an ongoing crusade, 
and thus cannot perceive any equanimity in their relationship. In the same manner that Vronsky 
had perceived Kitty’s heart as the reward of a battle between two foes, he views the attainment of 
Anna’s heart as a battle between despair and happiness. For Vronsky, the concept of romance is 
equivalent to that of a battle: alike to war, Kitty’s decision would produce a victor and a loser; 
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similarly, Anna’s decision would yield either one positive or one negative outcome, either a 
victory of “such happiness” and or a defeat of “despair.”  
It isn’t long before the reader foresees that Vronsky and Anna’s affair will result in the 
latter. Their mutual defeat is sharply anticipated the moment Vronsky finally beds Anna, for this 
is a scene that, more so than any other scene in the novel, illustrates the warlike nature of his 
pursuit of and affair with her. For, in finally satisfying the goal that had replaced all his “former 
desires” and “constituted the one exclusive desire of [his] life,” Vronsky reduces Anna to a 
casualty of war (Tolstoy 149): 
Alexei Vronsky: ‘Anna! Anna!’ he kept saying in a trembling voice. ‘Anna, for God’s 
sake!...’ 
But the louder he spoke, the lower she bent her once proud, gay, but now shame-stricken 
head, and she became all limp, falling from the divan where she had been sitting on the 
floor at his feet; she would have fallen on the carpet if he had not held her. (Tolstoy 149) 
Instead of being overwhelmed with the “happiness” that Vronsky had promised her, Anna 
temporarily becomes an avatar of his actions. In underscoring the limpness of Anna’s body, 
which “would have fallen” to the floor without Vronsky’s support, Tolstoy compares her 
likeness to that of a corpse. Indeed, building upon this metaphor, Vronsky is described as “what 
a murderer must feel when he looks at the body he has deprived of life” (Tolstoy 149). The 
symbolism of these descriptions must not be overlooked; Vronsky and Anna’s relationship 
emulates a battle, wherein each individual who lives is essentially a murderer, and each 
individual who falls is the murdered. Their affair is interchangeable with a continuous, prolonged 
murder, as the kisses Vronsky “covers [Anna’s] face and shoulders with” are emblematic of a 
murderer who falls upon his dead victim “with animosity” (Tolstoy 149). This figurative 
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homicide anticipates Anna’s near death after she gives birth to she and Vronsky’s child, and her 
eventual suicide at a Russian train station. In both instances she is pushed to the brink of death 
by Vronsky’s influence in her life, but only in the latter does she truly experience it due to the 
absence of his continuing, toxic presence. The arms that prevented her from falling onto the 
carpet and encouraged her to continue a descent into immorality were not there to save her from 
hitting the floor of the train tracks and escaping from this descent forever. 
Tolstoy’s employment of warlike language in this scene demonstrates Western novelists’ 
tendency to connect “sexual and fighting instincts” (de Rougemont 244). Beginning in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, these novelists enriched the language of love with phrases and 
expressions that “had unmistakably been borrowed from the art of giving battle” as well as from 
“contemporary tactics” (de Rougemont 244). In fact, not only the language, but the entire 
trajectory of Vronsky’s pursuit of Anna almost perfectly imitates de Rougemont’s analysis of the 
narratives of Western novels that emulated the period of European romanticism:  
A lover besieged his lady. He delivered amorous assaults on her virtue. He pressed her 
closely. He pursued her. He sought to overcome the final defences of her modesty, and to 
take them by surprise. In the end the lady surrendered to his mercy. And thereupon, by a 
curious inversion typical enough of courtesy, he became the lady’s prisoner as well as 
her conqueror. (de Rougemont 244) 
In regards to the last sentiment articulated in the above passage, Vronsky unquestionably 
becomes as much Anna’s prisoner as her conqueror. Indeed, simply because Vronsky drives 
Anna to a figurative, then close, then actualized death does not mean that he himself doesn’t 
suffer in the war he has initiated. During the short time period in which Anna appears to be dying 
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from childbirth-related causes and to be devoid of the love that she once held for Vronsky, her 
“murderer” attempts to commit suicide.  
When Anna becomes fatally ill during childbirth, the doctors proclaiming that there is 
“no hope” for her survival, Vronsky still perceives their affair as an ongoing battle, rather than as 
a war that is nearing its end (Tolstoy 411). Meeting with Alexei Alexandrovich in his and Anna’s 
home, Vronsky addresses Alexandrovich as if the man were a combatant, insisting that he is 
entirely at Alexandrovich’s mercy and appealing to his pathos by humanizing himself: 
‘Alexei Alexandrovich…I am unable to speak, unable to understand. Spare me! However 
painful it is for you, believe me, it is still more terrible for me.’ (Tolstoy 414) 
Although Vronsky struggles to maintain his self-composure before encountering Alexandrovich, 
after speaking with him and learning that Alexandrovich forgives both himself and Anna for 
their affair, and is thus a character “lofty and even inaccessible to him in his world-view,” does 
Vronsky begin to consider the possibility of suicide (Tolstoy 415). Indeed, it is not Anna’s 
approaching death, but his own perception of himself as the loser, as the irreparably “shamed, 
humiliated, guilty” party within an ongoing battle for Anna’s love, that encourages Vronsky to 
end his life (Tolstoy 415). He is exposed to Karenin’s “rightness” and “his own wrongness” at 
the moment in which he loved Anna more than he ever had before, “to love her as he ought to 
have loved her” (Tolstoy 415). And thus he could not deny the clarity of his own defeat and 
Karenin’s victory: 
The deceived husband, who till then had seemed a pathetic being, an accidental and 
somewhat comic hindrance to [Vronsky’s] happiness, had suddenly been summoned by 
her and raised to an awesome height, and on that height the husband appeared not 
wicked, not false, not ludicrous, but kind, simple and majestic. (Tolstoy 415) 
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Indeed, Vronsky sinks into a deep depression not precisely because he is a failure, but because he 
is not the victor. Because Karenin is too magnanimous of a being to end Vronsky’s life for him, 
Vronsky feels obligated to do it himself with his weapon of choice. Pointing a gun to his chest, 
Vronsky pulls the trigger in his certainty of his own downfall, in his cognizance of his 
“happiness lost for ever” and of “the meaninglessness of everything he saw ahead of him” 
(Tolstoy 417).  
Yet, Vronsky ultimately fails to kill himself, and shortly following the failed suicide 
attempt he aims to guide his life in a new and more virtuous direction. Declaring himself 
“washed...of the shame and humiliation he had felt previously,” and now able to recognize the 
magnanimity of Alexandrovich without feeling himself degraded (Tolstoy 433), Vronsky accepts 
a martial assignment in Tashkent “without the slightest hesitation” (Tolstoy 434). But, 
alarmingly, as his time to depart approaches, the more difficult “became the sacrifice he was 
offering to what he considered his duty” (Tolstoy 434). Indeed, Vronsky is ultimately unable to 
join the regiment in Tashkent and decides to resign from the army altogether – but such an action 
should come as no surprise to the reader.  
In attempting his suicide, the martial character Vronsky had adopted and that had guided 
the entirety of his life falls away like a loose jacket, signifying his uncoupling from the military. 
For, as Vronsky searches for a motive to live, “the habits and rules” or code of conduct that 
structures his life and evokes his soldierly upbringing abruptly seem to him both “false and 
inapplicable” (Tolstoy 415). If this is not indicative enough of Vronsky’s transformation, the 
manner in which he fails to kill himself should be; although the shot he had fired “was 
dangerous,” it was ineffective in ending his life because “it had missed the heart” (Tolstoy 435). 
Because Vronsky’s heart, the symbol of his immoral love, remains uninjured, the reader should 
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anticipate his choice to continue fighting in this depraved battle rather than to abandon it so that 
he may immerse himself an authentic form of warfare. It follows that, despite the veracity of 
Anna’s claims that “there’s something terrible” in their love “after all that’s happened,” Vronsky 
does what his former mode of thinking would have dismissed as “disgraceful and impossible” 
due to its appearance of impropriety to those “in high places”: he declines his assignment to 
Tashkent, and at once resigns his commission (Tolstoy 435). He and Anna travel abroad without 
her and Alexandrovich’s son and without confirming that Alexandrovich would grant her a 
divorce. 
With his desertion of the war effort, Vronsky’s private warfare only heightens in tension, 
depravity and idleness imbuing his post-soldier life. Abroad with Anna, Vronsky becomes 
rocked with boredom, fleeting from hobby to hobby in order to fill the gap left by his 
abandonment of his regiment. Although he has now secured the unimpeded devotion and love of 
Anna – who has deserted both her husband and her son to flee abroad with him – and “never 
showed the slightest regret” in “sacrific[ing] his ambition for her,” he was far from being “fully 
happy” (Tolstoy 464-465). As Leavis asserts, “Vronsky, having given up his career and his 
ambition for love, has his love,” yet nevertheless quickly begins “to give out…a vibration of 
restlessness and dissatisfaction” (23): 
He soon felt that the realization of his desire had given him only a grain of the mountain 
of happiness he had expected. It showed him the eternal error people make in imagining 
that happiness is the realization of desires…He soon felt in his soul a desire for desires, 
an anguish. Independently of his will, he began to grasp at every fleeting caprice, taking 
it for a desire and a goal. (Tolstoy 465) 
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In specifying that Vronsky exercises will power “independent of his will,” Tolstoy suggests that 
Vronsky remains in battle despite his resignation from his commission. Indeed, in his relentless 
and will-less ennui, Vronsky is the picture of “a hungry animal” who “seizes upon every object it 
comes across” (Tolstoy 465). The once promising soldier now “quite unconsciously” tries to 
nurture his interests in a wide range of arbitrary subjects and activities, including politics, the 
exploration of new books, and painting (Tolstoy 465). 
Yet, the politics, the reading, the painting, eventually the architecture – these, like 
Vronsky’s attraction to death – are fleeting interests. For example, Vronsky’s enthusiasm for 
painting wanes; he does not finish the painting he starts, certain that – like his relationship with 
Anna – “its defects, little noticeable in the beginning, would become striking if he went on” 
(Tolstoy 479). As Leavis argues, the ephemerality of Vronsky’s new vocations demonstrates that 
they cannot “give Vronsky what he lost when he left the army and the familiar milieu,” including 
“the friends and comrades with whom he had lived in his old career” (24).  
Almost immediately after Vronsky shelves his passion for art, he and Anna decide to 
return to Russia and stay at Vronsky’s Petersburg family estate (Tolstoy 479). Yet, even there 
Vronsky remains insatiable, and Anna is not ignorant of it; as she reveals to one of the few 
friends she maintains after forsaking her home life:  
‘Men need diversion, and Alexei needs an audience, so I value this whole company. We 
must keep it gay and animated, so that Alexei won’t wish for anything new.’ (Tolstoy 
620) 
Anna becomes increasingly anxious that Vronsky will not only grow weary of his new, 
haphazard lifestyle but of her as well; her chief concern, in fact, becomes “herself, in so far as 
she was dear to Vronsky” and “in so far as she was able to replace for him all that he had 
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abandoned” (Tolstoy 643). Yet, this concern only creates greater problems for herself and 
Vronsky, the latter of whom feels increasingly hampered by Anna’s presence. Indeed, Vronsky 
begins to cultivate an “ever strengthening desire to be free” and to not “have a scene every time 
he had to go to town for a meeting or a race” (Tolstoy 643).  
Although Vronsky feels inextricably attached to Anna by his love, and Anna to him by 
the despondency of her situation, their relationship becomes plagued with never-ending conflict, 
which comes more and more to mirror the conflicts of war. In one of their more heated 
arguments, Anna rightly accuses Vronsky of being obsessed with being “victorious” over her, 
and of gazing at her with “hostility” in his eyes, as if she was his enemy rather than his lover: 
…‘For you it’s a question of whether you are victorious over me, but for me…’ Again 
she felt pity for herself and she all but wept. ‘If you knew what it is for me! When I feel, 
as I do now, that you look at me with hostility – yes, with hostility – if you knew what 
that means for me! If you knew how close I am to disaster in these moments, how afraid I 
am, afraid of myself!’ (Tolstoy 705) 
Tolstoy integrates a number of allusions to war in the language he employs following Anna’s 
emotional outburst. Anna’s last statement in the above passage overtly foreshadows her 
impending suicide and earns her “the victory” in her and Vronsky’s dispute (706). She is aware 
of her success, seeking to hide her “triumph[ant]” expression from Vronsky as she distinguishes 
his cold tone, a tone that “repented of having given in” (Tolstoy 605). In recognizing that her 
final words equate to “a dangerous weapon,” Anna internally promises herself that she could not 
use them again in their next conflict (Tolstoy 706).  
 Unfortunately, she does more than repeat these words: she acts on them, tossing herself 
underneath the carriage of a train, one of her final thoughts being that her action would be one 
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that punishes and thus defeats Vronsky (Tolstoy 768). Ironically, the first time the reader 
encounters Vronsky following Anna’s death, he is on a train at the same station where Anna ends 
her life. Hiding his hands in his pockets and donning a “long coat,” as well as a hat that was 
“pulled down over his eyes,” Vronsky appears a man impatient to vanish from the world 
surrounding him (Tolstoy 779). Declaring that “[n]othing in life is pleasant” for him, Vronsky 
boards the train to fight in the Russo-Turkish War, at which his sole ambition is to die (Tolstoy 
779-780). Indeed, Vronsky, like Carton, satisfies de Rougemont’s portrayal of the typical 
character born from the period of European romanticism, for which passion requires death to “be 
the end of all things” (260). Gone is the “young and brilliant officer” who had so swiftly fallen in 
“with the ways of rich Petersburg military men” (Tolstoy 56). In his place is the defeated soldier, 
dead in spirit and eager to die in the forlorn reality in which he found himself:  
‘As a man…I’m good in that life has no value for me. And I have enough physical energy 
to hack my way into a square and either crush it or go down – that I know. I’m glad there’s 
something for which I can give my life, which is not so much needless as hateful to me. It 
will be useful to somebody.’ (Tolstoy 780) 
After beginning his affair with Anna, Vronsky began “to lose his hair prematurely on 
top” (Tolstoy 180). Content in both his liaison and his venerated position, he hadn’t given much 
attention to the physical defect, responding to someone’s recognition of his bald spot with a 
merry laugh that revealed “his solid row of teeth” (Tolstoy 180). Now, conscious of his 
responsibility for the lifeless and “blood-covered body” that he had personally identified 
amongst a shed full of strange corpses, he felt “an incessant, gnawing toothache” nagging the 
solid row of teeth that had once paradoxically distinguished his joviality (Tolstoy 780). The pain 
is so sharp that it prevents him from speaking, imprisoning him to “his tormenting inner 
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discomfort,” and forcing him to remember his immoral warfare of the heart, and Anna’s ultimate 
victory. Indeed, he remembers her promise that he would regret calling their relationship 
“unbearable,” and regret not attempting to appease her after he had said that (Tolstoy 753). He 
remembers how “cruelly vengeful” she had been in her last moments, and mentally parallels this 
vengeance with how “triumphant” she now appeared after accomplishing her dreadful threat 
(Tolstoy 781). 
III. Conclusion 
Clearly, the narrative of Alexei Vronsky is unlike that of Prince Andrey Bolkonsky or 
Count Pierre Bezukhov, two soldiers Tolstoy created 10 years prior to creating Vronsky. The 
purpose of analyzing Vronsky is to juxtapose his tragic trajectory with those of Andrey and 
Pierre and thus to establish Tolstoy’s view of the military profession as a potential gateway to 
edification. By committing themselves to the war effort, Andrey and Pierre both achieve edified 
states; in contrast, in eschewing the war effort, Alexei Vronsky leads a life devoid of the two 
components of edification: morality and the attainment or knowledge of human purpose.  
Importantly, this is not to say that Tolstoy’s novels are grounded in the argument that 
violence and suffering are essential for characters to realize their edification. Rather, the author 
appears to simply be arguing that one can achieve edification through pursuing careers in 
military combat, that violence can be an element of edification. In other words, Vronsky does not 
precisely fail to achieve a moral status because he dissociates himself from the military and thus 
from an atmosphere of organized combat; his tragic ending is a direct product of his immoral and 
passionate affair with Anna. Why Vronsky’s status as a soldier is significant is because his 
military career deliberately symbolizes a virtuous route apparent in his life, and thus functions to 
emphasize the immorality inherent in his decision to venture away from it.  
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Counterparts 
War and Peace 
 Andrey is mind, intellect, calculation. Pierre is emotion, soul, spirit. (Briggs 47) 
While Barnaby Rudge, A Tale of Two Cities, and Anna Karenina all contain one 
character each of interest to this paper, War and Peace contains two: Prince Andrey Bolkonsky 
and Count Pierre Bezukhov. These two characters stand in dialectical relation to each other, and 
accordingly serve as each other’s counterparts in the novel. Each are equally worthy of 
discussion because – unlike the characters who perform the same complementary function for 
Barnaby Rudge, Sydney Carton, or Alexei Vronsky – they follow analogous trajectories wherein 
violence is an integral element of their edification.    
I have already addressed a number of ways in which the lives of Andrey and Pierre both 
juxtapose and parallel one another. Like Andrey, who was fixated with becoming showered with 
glory, Pierre seeks to fulfill his own absurd and irrational goal after enlisting in the war: to kill 
Napoleon Bonaparte. And, like Andrey, Pierre experiences immense gratification in joining his 
regiment and becoming affiliated with the other soldiers. Most pointedly, I have shown how, 
after surviving the war effort, Pierre adopts the life Andrey would have led had he survived the 
war, marrying his ex-fiancée Natasha Rostov and developing closer relations with his sister, 
Marie Bolkonsky. Indeed, while it is an accepted convention that individuals are survived by the 
family that they leave behind, Andrey is survived by the most intimate friend that he leaves 
behind. 
Demonstrably, there are a multitude of ways in which Tolstoy crafts an implicit but 
profound connection between Andrey and Pierre. What will be addressed in this section are how 
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the respects in which they counter one another anticipate and reinforce their edification in the 
novel. Indeed, had Tolstoy eschewed including either Andrey or Pierre in his narrative, the moral 
and intellectual enlightenment of either character would not have been made as clear or logical to 
the reader. 
As Briggs suggests, Andrey represents the logos of the novel, and Pierre the pathos. The 
former is “a very handsome man, of medium height, with clear, clean-cut features” (Tolstoy 12), 
while the latter is oppositely “clumsy, stout, and uncommonly tall, with huge red hands” 
(Tolstoy 19). Andrey is a vigorous and dutiful soldier, son, brother, and father, as well as an 
apathetic husband to an artificial woman for a brief time in the story. Meanwhile, Pierre is the 
idle and illegitimate son of a father he loses early in the novel, as well as the estranged husband 
of an artificial woman for nearly the entire novel. Their storylines mirror and oppose one another 
in prominent ways throughout the lengthy text, but Tolstoy establishes quite early on that they 
function as each other’s counterparts. The passage below, for example, establishes conspicuous 
similarities and differences in their characters as well as the dynamic of their friendship: 
Prince Andrey: ‘…I am setting off now to the war, the greatest war there has ever been, 
and I know nothing, and am good for nothing…’ 
Pierre: ‘It seems absurd to me…that you, you consider yourself a failure, your life 
wrecked. You have everything, everything before you. And you…’ 
Pierre regarded Prince Andrey as a model of all perfection, because Prince Andrey 
possessed in the highest degree just that combination of qualities which in Pierre was 
deficient, and which might be most nearly expressed by the idea of strength of will. 
(Tolstoy 25) 
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Both Andrey and Pierre begin the novel dissatisfied with their ruts in life, the former deeming 
himself as “good for nothing” and the latter implying that it is he who is a “failure” (Tolstoy 25). 
They both desire improvement, and Pierre in particular believes his character would be enriched 
if he were more like Andrey, a man who he thinks possesses all of the good qualities that he 
personally lacks. The passage certainly anticipates both characters’ edification in demonstrating 
how profoundly they both aspire to better themselves. It also anticipates an ending in which 
Pierre emulates the “model of perfection” that he believes is personified by Andrey, leading a 
life that his deceased friend desired but never fully attains. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that 
Pierre’s evident reverence for Andrey’s “strength of will” is peppered with irony, as both he and 
Andrey become the most “perfect” versions of themselves only after entering atmospheres where 
Tolstoy argues the will loses its agency. 
 Although the characters’ paths do not cross often in the novel, their narratives often 
imitate and juxtapose one another. For example, both Pierre and Andrey marry women they do 
not love, and who either indirectly or directly drive them into combative environments. Andrey 
argues that everything “good and lofty” in him has been compromised by his loveless marriage 
to Princess Liza, and enlists in the war in order to retrieve these virtues (Tolstoy 12). Rumors of 
Ellen’s infidelity and knowledge of Ellen’s depraved character embolden Pierre to challenge her 
supposed lover to a duel, an action that he himself recognizes as senseless (Tolstoy 283). 
Moreover, just as Andrey twice enrolls in the war effort in order to escape the artificiality of 
Russian society, with its “[d]rawing-rooms, gossip, balls, vanity, frivolity,” Pierre eventually 
registers as a soldier partially for the same reasons. Indeed, Pierre was drawn to “the very thick 
of the battle” in Mozhaisk by both his “craving for sacrifice and suffering through the sense of 
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the common calamity” as well as a fresh hatred for the elitism that permeated his everyday life 
(Tolstoy 821): 
The other [factor] was that vague and exclusively Russian feeling of contempt for 
everything conventional, artificial, human, for everything that is regarded by the majority 
of men as the highest good in the world. (Tolstoy 821) 
Perhaps the most overt similarity between Andrey and Pierre is their mutual love for the young 
Natasha Rostov. Andrey is engaged to Natasha for a number of months before Anatole Kuragin, 
who she afterward discovers is married to another woman, seduces her. Although she reunites 
with Andrey once he has returned home from war for the second time after suffering a fatal 
injury, she is forever separated from him by his untimely death. It is Andrey’s passing that 
finally enables her and Pierre (who loses his estranged wife Ellen to a botched abortion) to be 
together. This actualizes a dream that Pierre keeps mostly suppressed throughout the novel, and 
allows him to inherit the life that Andrey would have led had he survived the war.  
 Natasha’s nascent love for Pierre produces a scene of dialogue between herself and Marie 
in which they acknowledge how different he and Andrey are in demeanor and appearance, yet 
how equal they are in their love for one another and especially in their edified conditions. 
Natasha in particular comments that Pierre appears as if he has just emerged from “a moral 
bath”: 
‘…He has become so clean and smooth and fresh; as though he had just come out of a 
bath; do you understand? Out of a moral bath. Isn’t it so?’ 
‘Yes,’ said Princess Marya [Marie]. ‘He has gained a great deal…I can understand how 
he’ (Prince Andrey) ‘cared for no one else as he did for him,’ said Princess Marya. 
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‘Yes, and he is so different from him. They say men are better friends when they are 
utterly different. That must be true; he is not a bit like him in anything, is he?’ 
‘Yes, and he is such a splendid fellow.’ (Tolstoy 1019) 
While the differences between Andrey and Pierre further illustrate how they act as each other’s 
counterparts, Marie and Natasha dually emphasize the significance of the similarities that they 
share, which includes their analogous plot trajectories, their mutual respect for one another, and 
especially the edification that they achieve by the novel’s end. 
 
Anna Karenina  
 
Although Vronsky’s counterpart in Anna Karenina does not appear nearly as frequently 
in the novel as the other counterparts that have been analyzed, he serves an important role within 
it. Particularly, he personifies the successful life Vronsky would have led had he remained with 
the military instead of chosen to pursue an illicit affair with Anna Karenina, and thus 
foreshadows and underscores his lack of moral or intellectual improvement at the novel’s end. 
 Before Vronsky’s devotion to Anna extinguishes his commitment to the Russian 
military, Vronsky greatly admires his regiment and was greatly admired by the other soldiers 
within it: 
They not only loved him, they also respected him and were proud of him, proud that this 
enormously wealthy man, with an open path to every sort of success, ambition and 
vanity, disdained it all and of all interests in life took closest to the heart the view the 
interests of his regiment and his comrades. (Tolstoy 173) 
Indeed, it is often indicated throughout the novel that Alexei Vronsky boasts the potential to 
become a great soldier and to lead a rewarding life. At the beginning of the text, Vronsky thrives 
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in his position in the regiment; he is well aware of how highly his comrades regard him, and 
feels it “his duty to maintain the established view of himself” (Tolstoy 173). Yet, the reader is 
quickly informed that Vronsky’s attachment to Anna effectively diminishes his intent to remain 
well-respected in his regiment by weakening his militaristic ambitions; in the same scene 
captured above, it is later revealed that Vronsky had recently “refused a post offered to him and 
important for his career” so that he would “be able to see Anna” (Tolstoy 174). 
 Who would Vronsky have become had he never crossed paths with Anna Karenina? 
Although most readers may argue that such a question is impossible to answer, Tolstoy 
integrates a character into the novel that humanizes the attainment of the martial ambitions that 
were “the old dream of [Vronsky’s] childhood and youth” (306). He is Serpukhovskoy, a man 
“[o]f the same age as Vronsky and his classmate” and whose success in the corps reawakens “the 
worm of ambition that gnawed” at Vronsky with “renewed force” (Tolstoy 306): 
His childhood comrade, of the same circle, the same wealth, and a comrade in the 
corps…who had graduated in the same year, had been his rival in his class, in 
gymnastics, in pranks, and in ambitious dreams, had come back from Central Asia the 
other day. (Tolstoy 306) 
Indeed, Tolstoy incorporates a character into the novel who is of the same age and same 
socioeconomic and academic background as Vronsky, as well as triumphant in the same 
occupation.  
What chiefly distinguishes Serpukhovskoy from Vronsky are their respective statuses in 
the military; while the former is a general who “expected an appointment that might influence 
the course of state affairs,” Vronsky, despite being “independent and brilliant and loved by a 
charming woman,” was “only a cavalry captain” (Tolstoy 306). To suppress his jealousy of 
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Serpukhovskoy, Vronsky reminds himself that he could rise to his position within a short number 
of years, contemplating “[i]f I resign, I’ll be burning my boasts. By remaining in the service, I 
won’t lose anything” (Tolstoy 306). Indeed, the presence of Serpukhovskoy not only rekindles 
the martial ambitions threatened by Anna’s influence but also encourages Vronsky to remain in 
the service for as long as he can. Of course, had Vronsky actualized these aspirations, he would 
not have become entangled in the immoral form of warfare with and against Anna Karenina.  
 Serpukhovskoy epitomizes the good and noble life Vronsky disregards in his pursuit of 
an affair with Anna. But Serpukhovsky’s success in comparison to that of his friend does not 
cause him to look down upon him; in contrast, Serpukhovskoy recognizes Vronsky’s good 
standing in the military and his potential to rise through the ranks, likening himself to Vronsky in 
saying that society needs “a party of independent people like you and me” (Tolstoy 310). 
Moreover, because Serpukhovskoy has faith in Vronsky’s capabilities as a soldier, he advises 
him of how to most effectively keep his priorities in check: by using marriage to mitigate his 
hedonistic desires: 
‘Women are the main stumbling block in a man’s activity. It’s hard to love a woman and 
do anything. For there exists one means of loving conveniently, without hindrance - that is 
marriage...it’s as if you’re carrying a fardeau and doing something with your hands is only 
possible if the fardeau is tied to your back – and that is marriage...dragging this fardeau 
around without marriage – that will make your hands so full you won’t be able to do 
anything.’ (Tolstoy 312) 
Demonstrably, Serpukhovskoy does not singularly embody the military success Vronsky 
forsakes to be with Anna. He also acts as a commanding voice of reason within the novel: had 
Vronsky chosen to heed the advice of Serpukhovskoy and love “without hindrance,” he would 
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have accordingly been required to end his affair with Anna, who is not a small hindrance to him 
because he does not intend to marry her, but a tremendous hindrance to him because he does not 
even have the option to marry her. Indeed, although Serpukhovskoy’s prophecy that 
inconvenient love will keep Vronsky so occupied that he “won’t be able to do anything” is 
peppered with a vain, patronizing, and misogynistic attitude, it is an accurate prophecy 
nonetheless, and uttered by one who actualizes all that Vronsky had once hoped to achieve. 
Moreover, although Tolstoy may not necessarily agree that men need to marry in order to 
diminish their self-indulgent passions, he does paint marriage as an edifying and virtuous option 
available to Vronsky. When courting Kitty, Vronsky declares that he loved the Scherbatskys’ 
residence predominantly because he felt that he became “better there myself” (Tolstoy 58). This 
statement signifies the improvement potentially held in store for Vronsky should he have chosen 
to propose to Kitty, to take a wife.  
Some readers may argue that Serpukhovskoy merely functions as an arrogant soldier who 
lacks the complexity of most characters in the novel and whose abbreviated presence does not 
warrant extensive analysis. Yet, Serpukhovskoy does appear multiple times throughout the text – 
both in person and in the psyche of Vronsky – and each time he appears, he evokes the socially 
sanctioned path readily available to and longing to be traveled upon by Vronsky. For example, 
when romanticizing a duel between himself and Alexandrovich, Vronsky recalls the advice of 
Serpukhovsky – “that it was better not to bind himself” – and immediately resolves not to discuss 
the potential of a duel with Anna or further consider the needlessly destructive idea for the time 
being; his sudden silence on the subject recalls his earlier dismissal of duels, specifically when 
he prevented one from breaking out between two soldiers in his regiment (Tolstoy 315). 
Moreover, after Vronsky believes that his affair with Anna has come to an end following her 
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near death in childbirth, it is Serpuhovskoy who offers the assignment for him in Tashkent that 
he refuses so that he can travel abroad with Anna, in effect refusing an honorable alternative for 
a romance steeped in immorality. Most notably, Serpuhovskoy influences a pivotal action in the 
text – though his presence in the scene is confined to the imagination of Vronsky. When 
contemplating suicide, both Anna and Alexei Alexandrovich are weighing heavily on Vronsky’s 
mind, but Serpukhovskoy is the last person Vronsky considers before pulling the trigger: 
‘Ambition? Serpukhovsky? Society? Court?’ He could not fix on any of them. That had 
all meaning once, but now nothing remained of them. He got up from the sofa, took off 
his frock coat, loosened his belt and, baring his shaggy chest in order to breathe more 
freely, paced up and down the room. ‘This is how people lose their minds,’ he repeated, 
‘and shoot themselves…so as not to be ashamed.’ (Tolstoy 417) 
The person of Serpukhovskoy is grouped with three other facets of Vronsky’s life that 
have suddenly become purposeless, fallen to “nothing” due to his all-consuming affair with 
Anna: ambition, society, and court. What exactly Vronsky is contemplating in recalling 
Serpukhovskoy is left up to the reader’s interpretation, but it is likely in connection with the 
concept that Vronsky considers immediately beforehand: his ambition, and how Anna’s 
influence has caused it to vanish from his life. Serpuhovskoy personifies the product of that 
ambition, yet rather than arousing determination and initiative in the soul of Vronsky as it once 
had, it now signifies the emptiness and meaninglessness that remains in place of it. Indeed, in 
this scene, Serpuhovskoy’s presence in the novel foreshadows Vronsky’s swift desertion of the 
regiment – which occurs shortly after his failed suicide attempt – and Vronsky’s ultimate 
inability to experience edification. 
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Conclusion 
In examining the work of Tolstoy and Dickens, I have chosen not to emphasize the numerous 
respects in which their novels differ. Dickens, an Englishman, wrote texts that explore how the 
lives of lower to middle-class English citizens become upended by the political corruption and 
turmoil that beset the city of London and the country of France in the late 1700s. Meanwhile, 
Tolstoy, of Russian descent though of European consciousness, interweaves depictions of the 
formal conventions and complexities of war with the cultural conventions and complexities of 
Russian aristocratic society in his first masterpiece, War and Peace, and focuses primarily on the 
latter in his second, Anna Karenina. In terms of history, Dickens and Tolstoy place their fictional 
characters within different settings based on or coinciding with true historical events, including 
the Gordon Riots of 1780, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Serbian-Turkish 
War. The various ways in which the novelists engage with their own cultures in their texts, as 
well as the ways in which they enter historical conversations by incorporating historical events 
into their texts, all merit further consideration and analysis. 
In truth, there are many formal, historical and experiential ways in which I could have 
discussed Dickens, Tolstoy, and their novels. I could have highlighted how their texts differ in 
style and genre, or the ways in which the novels elicit different effects upon the minds and 
emotions of their readers. Yet, I have chosen to subordinate these differences and the infinite 
number of other differences distinguishing the work of Dickens from that of Tolstoy in order to 
elicit a certain universal and philosophical but very human aspect of experience. 
Why have I chosen not to elaborate upon these ideas? The simple answer is that I cannot 
possibly address all of them in the span of one paper. The more holistic answer is that my paper 
is chiefly concerned with the shared edification of Dickens and Tolstoy’s characters – an early 
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and intuitive apprehension I had of the novels on first reading them – which does not warrant or 
necessarily invite attention to and analysis of their particular cultural, historical, or artistic 
ontologies, or the limitless other ways in which their novels differ.  
Indeed, the purpose of this paper lies not in where the authors differ, but in where they 
converge. To focus on where they converge, I have illuminated the universality of their novels, 
and I have treated the novelists as if they are in universal conversation with each other. I have 
exemplified how their narratives link violence to moral and intellectual improvement, and hence 
I have reified their analogous belief in the indefatigable ability with which human beings are able 
to improve in spirit and grow in self under the most difficult of circumstances.  
Each character examined in this Thesis pursues actions in their shared search of a sense of 
fulfillment, and satisfy this search by improving both morally and intellectually after entering 
circumstances of war, riots, or executions. Barnaby Rudge contributes to the mayhem of the 
Gordon Riots in his desire to be of value to the ‘No Popery’ movement, which he falsely 
believed would make his mother proud. Sydney Carton languishes in idleness and an entrenched 
feeling of self-loathing until he sacrifices himself at a public execution. Andrey goes to war to 
pursue a life that exists outside of the weariness and artificiality of Russian society, and Pierre 
devotes himself to a wide array of new experiences, including marriage, Free Masonry, and 
finally to the war effort, in his struggle to improve himself and the condition of the life he leads. 
Finally, Alexei Vronsky aspires to heighten his prestige in the military before deciding to instead 
fulfill his life through the pursuit of an illicit affair with a married woman. Indeed, in the four 
novels that I have analyzed, the experience of edification demonstrates that human nature can 
evolve and become enlightened through action and interactions, and, ironically, especially 
through those that are rooted in violence.  
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Yes, some of these novels are bleak in ending, and all of them grapple with harrowing 
concepts of death and senseless destruction. But because they all share this admittedly peculiar 
component, I cannot consider the essence of these novels as anything other than life-affirming. 
And hence I cannot dismiss my belief that they were partially created to voice the authors’ 
shared faith in humankind.  
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